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Americans use a large amount of energy.

We constitute about five

percent of the vorld's population and use a third of the world's energy
resources. I

We rely on nonrenevable fossil fuels to pover our homes, our

cars, and many items which used to

be

run by hand, such as automatic can

openers, electric knives and forks, thread spoolers, paver car vasher/
vaxers, and so on.

Everything from the large dairy farm to the space pro

gram depends on tremendous quantities of natural resources -- for lighting,
moving, heating, and cooling.

More than a third of our energy use is in the

form of electricity, provided by large power plants vhich in turn require
coal, oil, natural gas, or uranium. 2

This high-energy-use lifestyle ve live

is rather luxurious; and it shove fev signs of changing.
But there are certain obstacles impeding this lifestyle, and the most
frightening of these is the inevitable scarcity of the resources upon vhich
ve base our livelihood.

The publication of� Limits to Grcvth in 19723

vas only the first in a long series of scientific confirmations cf the fact
that the planet we inhabit is finite, and once ve have exploited the re
sources vhich are available, ve shall no longer be able to live as ve have.
One of the most significantly affected areas will be the generation of
electricity: it is possible that our society is so heavily tied to large
scale power production that no alternatives will be available if resources
run out.

If the alternatives in that situation are the same ones ve have

today, our consumption of energy will, of necessity, drop precipitously.
If the United States is concerned to strengthen its defenses against
attack, release itself from the grip of oil-producing nations, enforce
emission standards for factories and power plants, reduce air pollution and
toxic vaste build-up, and simultaneously maintain the standard of living it
has built up over the past decades, it must promptly begin taking steps to
remedy the electricity generation situation.

Indeed, all of these problems

-

•
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are tied to our energy system: some of the prime targets for terrorist and
foreign powers are our large nuclear and coal-fired plants;4 a significant
proportion of imported petroleum has traditionally been used in oil-fired
power plants; emissions of sulphur dioxide, nitrous oxides, and other pollu
tants come primarily from coal-burning power plants; and many toxic and
radioactive wastes derive from the nuclear power industry.

Our attitude

toward energy use has exacerbated the problem: Americans have long assumed
that energy consumption correlates directly with quality of life despite the
fact that such a relation �as proved itself �e,ln the past two decades.
What can be done to correct this unhealthy situation?

are greatly needed.

-

Two w-a-tegies

First, electricity use must be reduced so that the

resources we exploit will not be extinguished rapidly.

Conservation

measures have become more popular in the U.S. and electricity consumption
has levelled off in recent years, but the predictions for the availability
of resources remain ominous. S The other strategy involves the development
of new technologies to generate electricity using renewable resources -
which include sunlight, water, wood, wind, and biomass.

Not all of these

are equally suited to the specific task of converting heat or light to
electricity.

Biomass (soil materials and compost> and wood are most effi

ciently used to produce heat; wind and water, though excellent sources for
electricity, are not necessarily available in all areas where they might be
needed.

<As we shall see, the closer a generating unit is to the end-user,

the more efficient it can be.>

Thus sunlight, which is spread relatively

evenly across the country <though at different durations and intensities>,
is an ideal renewable resource for electricity generation.

Through a pro

cess known as the •photovoltaic• effect, light striking a specially designed
cell is converted directly into electricity, requiring no moving parts. This
technology offers significant promise for the future of power generation.

7

•
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In this thesis I will address three large issues related to the devel-

opment of this solar electric technology:

---

First, I wish to demonstrate that

,
�·

photovoltaics offer significant advantages over traditional, nonrenewable

-����
energy sources -- that they are
superior to the technologies now used.

Part

I thus consists of a comparative analysis of coal-fired power plants, nu-

clear fission plants, and photovoltaics.

These are widely seen as the most

likely options in American electricity generation. 6

Each of these energy

systems will be discussed along the following four dimensions:

geology and

natural limits (i. e. , resource availability and waste management>; tech

nology <plant efficiencies and the relative merits of centralization>;

economics (initial capital investment, economies of scale, and long-term

issues); and politics and policy (the capture theory of government, economic

determinism, and prudence).

1

The second task is to shov that solar energy is important enough to

develop, despite the lack of short-term economic incentives to invest in

solar electricity.

If this is the case, then the argument for photovoltaics

takes on new dimensions: instead of merely speaking about photovoltaics as

•efficient• or •cost-feasible,• ve may also say that it is the proper action

to take.

The consideration of proper actions, and the Justification for one

proper action over another, is the domain of ethics.

of these ethical issues surrounding our energy future.

Part II assesses some

This section focuses

on our obligations to future generations, with reference to the three con

ventional schools of ethical thought: consequentialism, deontology, and
virtue ethics.

Part II concludes by broadly defining our needs in terms of

all of these perspectives, along with a concern for human nature and the

importance of vision.

While this analysis operates on a far more theoreti

cal and abstract level than Part I, its findings are clearly pertinent to

the crucial issue of which technologies will be employed in our not-so

distant future.

�·

•
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The final section of the thesis ponders the problem of change:

Hov

vill our society shift its priorities to bring about the use of photovol

taics?

The tvo strategies which have gained the most attention among envi

ronmental writers might be labeled •paradigm shifts• and •muddling.• After

discussing some of the ramifications and underlying assumptions of these

alternatives, I offer arguments for the adoption of vhat I call •visionary

mugg_ling,• vhich combines the best of each of these two alternatives.
task.

-

The adoption of a new technology is clearly a large and unpredictable
Many changes in human knowledge, in resource scarcities, or in

societal requirements can dramatically influence both the need for and the

In the case of electricity generation, there

acceptance of new innovations.

are numerous technologies competing for a place in America's energy future,
and some of them have gained significantly more attention than have photo

voltaics.

Both the nuclear breeder reactor and nuclear fusion systems have

been federally funded far beyond levels solar energy has ever attained, and
the current shadov of solar energy research and development shows the

\?

effects of that disinterest.
more flexible an

But I maintain that photovoltaics offer a far

realistic alternative for supplying our power than any of

the large-scale options offered.

While this thesis does not address those

options specifically, I feel it offers substantial.claims as to the super

iority of solar electricity.

In this thesis I cannot treat the full spect

rum of issues pertaining to the technical or ethical aspects of photovoltaic
technologies or of ecological sustainability in general, but I hope it will

raise issues vhich speak to these problems in a significant way.

•

#
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Part I: The Technical Case for Photovoltaics

This section attempts to identify the maJor advantages of photovoltaic

power generation
over traditional central station power plants using fossil
I Ii-

fuels.

W

I

will discuss the three ma3or competitors in terms of decentra-

lized and centralized means for generating electricity: nuclear fission,

coal firing, and solar photovoltaic cells.

While there are a great many

&

issues involved in such a comparison - many of which have required entire

books full of figures and technical data for their Justification -

discussion will emphasize issues in four broad areas which seem most crucial

to the future of America's energy production and use: geology, technology,

economics, and politics/policy.

The technologies in question involve highly diverse processes.

Simply

speaking, coal-fired power plants employ the heat energy produced through

the combustion of coal, which heats water into steam.

Nuclear fission also

converts water into steam, but instead of combusting materials, this process

relies on the tremendous heat found in the radioactivity of purified uranium

ore.

The steam is then pushed through large turbines, which in turn gene

rate electricity through their motion.

electricity generation process.

This is known as a •thermal•

Once the electricity is produced at a

centralized, large-scale plant, it is transmitted over electric lines to

smaller stations which then distribute the power to end-users - residential,
industrial, institutional, and so on.

•Transmission and distribution• <T&D>

refers to the process of getting power from the plant to the end-user.

Nuclear and coal-fired plants differ greatly in the procedures required

both to refine mined materials into usable forms and to create a controlled

environment for the production of steam.

For the purpose of this discus

sion, coal will be assumed to be a simpler and safer substance to burn

because it requires none of the radiation protection and high-temperature

.

,
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control mechanisms needed in the use of uranium and plutonium.

It is

important to note, though, that the relative safety cf these resources is a
matter of much controversy.

Radiation and waste disposal problems have

plagued the nuclear power industry; coal burning by itself fails to account
for the many lives lost annually in mines, the illnesses suffered by many
miners

(e.g.,

black lung>, and numerous environmental problems, from direct

air pollution to the effects of acid rain en flora and fauna.
As this thesis focuses primarily on solar cell technologies, they

re

quire a more detailed explanation. The photovoltaic effect, that of con
verting light directly into electricity, has been known for a long time, but
was not used on a wide scale until the United States began sending rockets
The cost of the cells (per peak watt) for space

and satellites into space.

missions has always been extremely high, due primarily to the extreme pre
cision and quality control required for these purposes.

There have also

been problems with the weight of the cells and their encapsulent (cover
material); the light-gathering arms on satellites cannot bear much weight.
Solar cells for space use characteristically cost over $1 million per peak
kilowatt (kWp).

(Photovoltaic power is rated in peak kilowatts, since the

output of the cells is so variable, unlike traditional thermal power genera
tion systems, which are normally rated in watts, kilowatts, or megawatts.
Peak power, in simple terms, is the functioning of a generator under optimal
conditions.>

In the last decade or so, the price has dropped to approxi

mately $10-15,000 per kWp,

a

decline of two orders of magnitude!

But the

goals commonly accepted for economic feasibility -- i.e., the price at which
photovoltaics would be able to compete with coal-fired power plants
another order of magnitude away.

is

The Department of Energy <DOE> in 1980 set

a goal of $.70 per Wp ($700 per kWp> by 1986 for array production to encour
age the industry to achieve cost-feasibility.

CA group of cells is encap

sulated into one unit called a •module•: a set of modules is an •array.• A

.

,
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•field• is a large, centralized group of arrays.) System costs (production
and installation) would be higher than this figure.

<Further, DOE cost

goals assume centralized energy fields; thus, large T&D systems must be
included in the cost; these would not exist for distributed photovoltaic
systems.>

But at this level it is thought that photovoltaics could compete

in most markets, including that for residential power production. 7
Geology and Natural Limits
There are two maJor issues to be considered under this heading: the
availability of resources, and the handling of the wastes (including nongeological pollution) incurred by the use of those resources.

Every energy /

technology relies on some geological resource, and every energy technolog'l
returns some byproduct to the air and the soils. Nuclear power requires
uranium ore and returns radioactive wastes to the earth; coal firing pro
duces ash, sulphur dioxide, and carbon dioxide; and photovoltaics require
vast amounts of � and various other materials in their production.
Availability of resources
Coal is a black, highly carbonaceous substance which has the
capacity to release energy when burned.

Types of coal are differentiated by

their •rank,• depending upon the amount of heat, pressure, and time under
which they were converted from woody plants some 300 million years ago into
carbonaceous rock today.

Anthracite is the hardest, most concentrated rank

of coal; thus it is regarded as the most efficient heating material by
weight.

But only one percent of the •identified• coal resources in the

United States (i. e. , accessible under present mining techniques) consist of
anthracite; the vast maJority of American coal is the softer, lower-ranked,
more sulphurous bituminous and sub-bituminous coal.
Unfortunately, few sources agree about the quantities of coal available

.

.
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on Earth, or, for that matter, in the U.S.

The following calculations,

based on government data, can be assumed to be intermediate between the
exaggerations of environmentalists and industry studies.

(By the capture

theory, 8 government figures are more likely to reflect the industry perspective than that of environmentalists.>

According to a reference published by

the Department of Energy, the U.S. has coal resources totalling •ore than an
estimated 3.9 trillion tons. Of that amount, over 56X is undiscovered, and
much of it is unrecoverable. That leaves 1.7 trillion tons of identified
U.S. coal, but again, the maJority of that quantity is too deep to be
efficiently mined, is in very thin layers, or is found under cities and
other developed areas which are unlikely to be moved for mining purposes.
The amount of coal in the Demonstrated Reserve Base <ORB> is about 438
billion tons, about 11.2% of the total American coal resource base. The ORB
comprises coal that is thought to be •technically and economically minable. •
Two-thirds of the ORB can be retrieved only by underground mines: the other
third is accessible for strip-mining operations.9
But there is, once again, a catch.

When coal is mined underground,

coal •pillars• must be left to prevent roof collapse as well as surface
subsidence; half or more of the coal must be left in the mines in this
technique.

In both underground and surface mining, much coal is lost to

geological folds, faults, and interlayed strata.

According to Coal Data,

For the Nation as a whole about half of the reserve base, or 219
billion tons, is estimated to be recoverable. According to the
World Energy Conference, the estimated recoverable coal reserves
in the United States rank first in the vorld, accounting for
about 31X of the tota1. lO
The entire world recoverable coal reserve, then, is about 700 billion tons.
How long can these coal resources last?

This is a complex issue, for a

conclusive answer requires a model for such factors as population growth,
energy consumption extrapolations, and power generation efficiency esti-

/-
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Very few studies have taken all of these factors into account; it is

mates.

common for these studies to conclude that our coal supply will last well

over 300 years -- plenty of time in which to consider transition sources of
energy. 11

-

The model I have used for my calculations fails to include any

model for growth; as we shall see, the case is only worsened by such fac

tors.

Coal presently accounts for about 55X of all electricity generated in

the U. S.

Due to the high price of oil and natural gas, coal is widely rec

ognized as the energy soure of the future.12

Thus it is clear that. the use

of coal will continue to increase as it has for the last decade, 13

average coal-fired plant generates at an operating capacity of

500

If an

MW, and

burns an average of 5. 5 tons of coal per minute, 14 and if, as my analyses

suggest, there are approximately 910 such plants in the country, 15 then our
recoverable 219 billion tons of coal will be extinguished within 84 years.

The only way the United States could produce coal-fired electricity Cat

present rates under constant population) for 300 years would be to use the
entire world's recoverable reserve of 706. 5 billion tons.

To make matters

worse, only about half of our coal usage is in the generation of electric

ity; industrial processes such as steel-making require large quantities of

coke from coal.

for much longer.

We can hardly count on this resource to supply our power

This suggests that coal is not the panacea it has been thought to be.

While there are tremendous coal resources on our planet, we would be im

prudent to hunt for them, for the cost of bringing them back would likely

exceed the value of turning it into electricity.
less than

100

In any case, since we have

years of coal accessible to us - despite the short-term

economic incentives assuming quite the contrary - it would behoove us to

begin examining alternatives.

From a cost-feasibility standpoint, there are

two competing possibilities: nuclear fission and solar photovoltaics.

..
Nuclear

Page
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Nuclear fission is a more complex means of generating electricity,

largely due to the protection required to separate the radioactive materials
from humans and the environment.

There are many natural resources required

to construct and power a nuclear plant; in the interest of time and space, I
will focus only on the primary resource required: uranium.

Nuclear power

has two large advantages over coal with respect to resource requirements:

First, while coal plants burn 5. 5 tons per minute, nuclear power plants

require . 005 pounds of fuel per minute for a like-sized plant.

<It would

take almost 265 years for a nuclear fission plant to use 5.5 tons of uranium
fuel. ) 16

Second, fuel costs account for

SOX or more of the total cost of

generating electricity with coal; only 201. of electricity generation costs
in nuclear plants are devoted to uranium. 1 7

From a resource point of view,

nuclear power plants provide a hope which coal plants cannot.

One of the most fascinating issues with respect to uranium is the

discrepancy between mined ore quantities and power plant usage.

For

instance, if a 1000 KW nuclear plant needs, say, 36 tons of fuel (U02) per

year, that does not mean that only 36 tons of uranium ore must be mined.
fact, a highly elaborate milling, converting, enriching and fabrication

procedure is needed to •boil down• the ore into usable fuel -- from ore to

-

purified uranium oxide to uranium hexa �ou ·de to the final fuel itself.

a result,

8 5,

��

500 tons of ore are needed to make

- - which finally become the 36 tons of fue1. l8

162

In

As

tons of purified uranium

If the average nuclear power

plant generates at about 1000 KW capacity and if there are 138 operable

plants in the country, 1 9 then a total of about 5000 tons of fuel is needed

in the U. S. per year - - that is,

12

million tons of uranium ore per year, or

22,500 tons or uranium oxide each year.

Once again, we must wonder how long this can last.

disagree on the actual resource base available.

And again, sources

To take an intermediate

estimate, there are about 2 million tons of •proved-recoverable• uranium

•
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oxide in the vorld, with a resource base of nearly 4 million tons.

By the

consumption calculations above, ve have 90 years of certain nuclear pover

and about twice that if a larger recoverable base is assumed.

If the U. S.

has 840, 000 tons in reserve, we can operate at present levels for another 37

years. 20

<Note that the 90 or 37 year estimate for nuclear power is not

additive with the figures for coal: these calculations assume a continuation

of the current resource mix, such that coal provides approximately half of

our power, while nuclear power generates nearly 15¾.)

What seemed a trivial discrepancy has become a frightening portent

about assertions that •nuclear and coal-fired generating plants represent

the most cost-effective options for baseload service in the foreseeable

future, • and that •compared to the costs of operating existing plants fueled

with high-cost oil and gas, the economics of either nuclear or coal-fired

plants are compelling. • 2 1

We have not yet addressed economic issues in this

analysis, but already the absolute limits of available resources cause us to

wonder how economics could possibly help.
Solar

Perhaps the most distinct resource advantage of photovoltaics is

the cost and availability of fuel: its cost is non-existent in economic
terms, and its availability is only constrained by inclement weather.

(Sunlight has indirectly provided humankind with all our energy sources:

sunlight helped to grow the trees and plants which later were compressed
into coal, to feed the micro-organisms which were squeezed into various

petroleum products.

But this is the only technology to use it directly for

the production of electricity. )

The problem of land availability is at this

point an unresolved issue, but some solar developers have found rooftops an

ample resource for the siting of photovoltaic systems. 22

The primary re

source constraints on photovoltaics are material constraints, analogous to
the concrete and steel required to build coal and nuclear plants.

Since

.

"
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photovoltaics require aluminum, copper, nickel, iron, and steel in
quantities commensurate with fossil fuel generating facilities, I shall not
devote attention to these resources.
What photovoltaics do use a lot of is .silicon - far and away the most
abundant resource on Earth.

Silica, known more commonly as sand, is com

posed almost entirely of silicon dioixide, which must be highly purified to
be used in solar cells.

Silica, in different forms, is thought to compose

some GOX of the Earth's crust; it will not become scarce during the exis
tence of human beings.23 Silicon is used as the semiconductor material in
photovoltaics. It is very difficult to purify, and with the most common
technology must be formed into very thick (up to 100 micrometers) and
weighty cells.

l

The purified silicon is cast

must be cut into round cells.

as a

cylindrical ingot, which

This process is expensive and inefficient,

half of the silicon is lost as dust when the ingot is sawed.

as

Hewer tech-

nologies involve poly-crystalline and amorphous silicon cells which can be
•pulled• as long •ribbons• of 1-30 micrometers in thickness.

This method is

not yet perfected enough to be widely feasible for mass production, and
photovoltaics remain an expensive technology -- incapable of competing with
traditional nonrenewable sources of energy.
Work is now being done with some alternative substances, such as
Gallium Arsenide (GaAs>, Cadium Sulfide (CdS>, and Copper Sulfide (CuS) .
GaAs and CdS have the tremendous advantage of both fairly high efficiencies
and extreme thinness.

In fact, GaAs is presently being used

as a

spray (in

something called the •substrate• process> on a glass sheet, so the actual
light-sensitive thickness can be much less than 15 micrometers thick.
as one might guess, these materials have drawbacks as well.
same as arsenic and is a toxic substance.
known dangerous heavy metals.

But,

Arsenide is the

Cadmium is one of the better

But cadium is widely used in plating and

•

,,
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alloying processes, and is cheaply mined.

The world cadium resource base is

estimated at nearly 1. 39 million tons, easily enough to last many hundreds

of years. 24 Gallium, not highly toxic, is a byproduct of the aluminum manu

facturing process.

But the amount of aluminum that would have to be pro

duced for a usable amount of gallium to be removed is approximately
times present production.

exactly healthy these days.

50-200

And the aluminum and copper markets are not

than silicon is availability.

The other maJor problem with any material other
Though much less GaAs or CdS would be needed

to make the cells, the quantities needed are still tremendous for widespread

use.

With toxicity and limited availability staring one in the face, the

future may seem dim for some of these experimental substances.

But there is

widespread consensus that silicon solar cells have great potential, and re
source limits are highly unlikely to impede the its development. 25
Wastes

Fossil fuels as a group are notorious for contributing hazardous mate

rials to the environment.

These are generally known as byproducts; we will

discuss their influence on the planet and the means by which they are

handled.

(Waste heat •thermal pollution• and the climatic consequences of

excess carbon dioxide from power plants will be discussed in a later

subsection.>

Coal contributes to environmental pollution with far greater

diversity than nuclear fission.

When coal is strip-mined, vast quantities

of land are reduced to barren deserts; reclamation proJects have not been
particularly successful.

When coal is burned, there are four significant

byproducts: ash, sulphur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, and carbon dioxide.

these, ash and sulphur dioxide are perhaps the most problematic.

Of

A coal

fired power plant which generates 1000 MW of electricity requires more than
345 tons of coal per hour.

As a result, the plant produces 35-40 tons of

•
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3 3-car

ash per hour, or enough ash to fill a

including airborne particulates! 26

trainload every day - not even

Coal ash can be used in various manu

facturing procedures, so it cannot be considered a complete waste, but as a
byproduct of electricity generation it must be considered.

Coal does not directly contribute much in the way of geological wastes,

but it is perhaps the largest single culprit in American air pollution in

general, and in sulphur dixoide emissions in particular.

The notorious acid

rain problem, which increasingly •kills• lakes and forests in the U. S. and

Canada, is directly attributable to coal-fired electric power generation.

According to the Council on Environmental Quality, power plants are respon

sible for more than 76X of sulphur dioxide emissions in the U. S. , or some 24

million tons per year. 27 Since the passage of the Clean Air Act in 1970,

electric utilities have spent more than $150 billion on scrubbers and

electrostatic precipitators to reduce these emissions. 28

(Both of these

technologies create their own wastes, generally in the form of sludge. )

According to one source, plants constructed with scrubbing technology (which

removes nearly 90X of the sulphur in the flue gas) cost about $400 per kW

more than those without - more than doubling the price of the plant.

(A

non- scrubbing 600 MW plant cost about $237 million to build in 1980 : a plant
with scrubbers cost $477 million. ) 29

Clearly, the cost of controlling air

pollution is exorbitant; accordingly, pollution levels remain well above

satisfactory environmental and human health standards.
Nuclear

Because of the complex nuclear fuel cycle, fission plants produce

larger quantities of waste than the amount of fuel they need over a given

period of time.

Thus, while a typical 1000 MW nuclear facility uses 0. 3

pounds of fuel per hour, it produces

2.

7 pounds of radioactive waste per

hour, due to the activation of materials peripheral to the process.

year, a single plant produces 12 tons of nuclear wastes. 30

In a

Through 1980,
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according to a recent government study, •about 36 million tons of low-level
radioactive waste and 8,300 tons of high-level waste have been generated by
commercial nuclear power.

By the year 2000, these levels could rise to

levels ten-fold greater•••• •31 But, from a geological point of view, is

there a satisfactory method for disposing of radioactive vastes1

There are

three primary ways to deal with them: deep mine repositories, shallow

repositories, and sea burial.32
Deep mine repositories:

Simply speaking, wastes are put in canisters or

cylinders and then left in old mines or mine shafts.

The cylinders are

packed so that the wastes are surrounded by an absorbant geologfical
material. The present controversy in deep mine disposal concerns the type
of rock to use for optimal absorbence and heat tolerance.

The three most

promising candidates are halite Crock salt), granite, and shale or tuff.
Halite has the advantage of being ductile and plastic, so that it will
resist cracking under stress. As it is a soft material, drilling a well or
mine for the canisters would be inexpensive.

But radioa/ctive wastes must

not only have their heat contained; they must also be kept safely away from
water sources.

Salt, unfortunately, contains water, both in its intra

crystalline structures and in larger pockets. There may be layers of gypsum
or clay in halite mines, which are hydrous materials (i.e., if heat is
applied, they lose water> .
salinity.

Halite is also dangerous because of its

Brine, commonly found in rock salt regions, can easily corrode

glass and metals, thus potentially exposing the wastes directly to the

I

environment. There are other probl ems with halite as well, such as fluid
pressures, carbon dioxide outbursts, solubility, and sags and sinkholes.
halite is the current favorite for waste disposal, but it is far from ideal
- or even safe.
The second possible rock is granite, well known for its hardness, its

..
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mechanical strength, and its overall impermeability.

But granite, unlike

halite, is very susceptible to fractures, which greatly undermine its •safe
seeming• qualities.

There is also a seismic risk in storing nuclear wastes

in granite, as the heat tends to stress the rock, possibly inducing earth

quakes.

As quakes are extremely difficult to predict anyway, it seems un

wise to tempt fate by burying wastes in a fragile environment.

Finally, shales and tuffs have been recommended for use in waste

disposal.

Heither is as strong as granite, nor as ductile as halite,

although each has sorptive capacities sometimes exceeding that of halite.

But as they are of a clay composition, they will release water molecules

under heat and lose their sorptive

ideal of the three alternatives.
Shallow repository:

They are considered the least

Open-pit mines, craters, and other areas of geological

subsidence are candidates for shallow repository waste sites.

The crater in

Yucca Flats, Nevada, was considered an ideal spot, being isolated from

civilization to a great extent, as well as being located in an arid region.

The crater, with a maximum depth of 100 meters, is almost 500 meters above

the water table and rests in an alluvium <underlaid by stream deposits) .

The advantages of such a site are: a) the wastes will tend to get buried as

the landform continues its natural subsidence, b) the sorptive capacities of
the geological materials (clays, primarily) will prevent leaching if a

canister were to break, c) there is little seismic danger in the area, and

d) the water flux is low enough that the wastes would be unlikely to enter

a dangerous area of wetness in 30, 000 years.

Of course, there are disad

vantages as well: a> there is some uncertainty about the existence of

pockets containing water within the alluvium, b) climatic changes would have
a greater effect on the materials, as they would be quite near the surface,

c) the area is shallow, and thus becomes increasingly vulnerable to human

•
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excavation - both in peaceful and wartime activities, and d} if the wastes
hit the water table or even a pocket which selectively precipitated the

wastes from the still active fuel, the heat of the materials could prove

dengerous.

Even if all of these difficulties were rectified, there are a

limited number of areas in the nation - or even in the world - which qualify
on geological criteria for safety and permanence.

Sea Burial:

In the mid-Pacific Ocean, the water is five to six kilometers

deep, and the bottom is composed of solid red clays.

In an area called the

Horth Pacific gyre (created by the Pacific currents>, there is a paucity of

marine life, and thus a minimum of geological deposition.

In other words,

the impermeable red clay is more exposed in the gyre than in other parts of
the Ocean.

If canisters were dumped from a boat at the surface, they would

settle perhaps 30 meters below the sea floor, making the wastes well pro

tected from the outside environment.

This area is probably the most stable

environment on the planet, having a steady temperature and pressure, tight

grained sorptive geological materials, a self-closing ability, and almost

complete lifelessness.

This sounds like an ideal solution, and it has been tried.

ately, a number of problems have arisen:

Unfortun

First, the response of the wastes

- at sea level pressure in their canisters - in the extreme pressures on the

sea floor some five kilometers down is quite uncertain.
implode at these differential pressures.

Canisters could

There is also the problem of the

salinity of salt water, which over time, has the potential to corrode most

materials.

buoyancy.

Finally, there is the empirically proven difficulty known as

The heat of the waste causes it to rise slowly through the clays,

re - emerging at the water's surface years after its •successful• burial.

( There is no completely satisfactory means for disposing of large quan
\ tities of radioactive waste.

Our technology has to rely on the status of
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the environment to a considerable extent.

The cost of developing new tech

nologies to protect the environment is thus exceedingly - and increasingly high.

when these technical

Once again, nuclear power loses its luster shi

details are seriously considered.

Solar

Photovoltaics, like most solar technologies, are considered

•clean• ; that is, they do not emit noxious fumes, produce geological wastes,
or otherwise pollute the environment while generating power,

But there are

----

two concerns with photovoltaics, and little is known about the effects of

either on the planet and its atmosphere.

First is the issue of reflectance.

A large land area covered with solar cells would reflect a large amount of

--

sunlight back at the clouds, which could potentially encourage the�
house effect already occurring.

p�otovoltaic cell production.

The other issue concerns the byproducts of

Questions have been raised as to the toxicity

cf silicon dust released in sawing silicon ingots, in addition to the var

ious other substances employed in cell production - such as cadmium, german
ium, trichlorostalline, arsenic, and others.

Too little is known about

these processes for any estimate to be made about the likely effects.

In my

Judgement, chances are great that the amounts and concentrations of photo

voltaic pollutant as a whole will be smaller than that of any single fossil
fuel installation.

J

Despite these questions, photovoltaics appear to have

significant geological and environmental advantages over either of the best

traditional energy sources.

�
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Technology

There are two technological issues which need to be discussed in our

analysis of energy systems.

-----

First is the matter of efficiency: how well do

these various systems work in theory and practice?

The second issue has to

do with centralization: what advantages do centralized facilities have in
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comparison with the more flexible, easily decentralized solar technology?
As part of the centralization issue, we must consider the transmission and

distribution of power, which involves some striking statistics.
Efficiency

Coal and Nuclear

Power plants of all sorts have a certain capacity of

electricity which they could generate under ideal conditions -- which

include humidity, altitude, power demand, proper pollution control, trans

mission conditions, equipment cleanliness, and the rank and purity of

the fuel itself.

Few optimum conditions are ever met; thus one must

calculate operating efficiencies for each given facility.

Most modern coal

plants, for instance, produce steam at about 1000 degrees F, and release

exhaust at approximately 212 degrees F, with a theoretical efficiency of
54X.

In actual operation, coal plants run at efficiencies closer to 40X.

In other words, when all factors are considered some 60X of the coal needed

to generate electricity is lost as waste heat. 33

Nuclear power plants operate at an intake temperature of 600 degrees F,

and exhaust at the same 212 degrees.

They have an upper efficiency limit of

about 40X, and an actual operating efficiency of closer to 30X. 3 4

These low

amounts can be considered a form of waste: the maJority of input fuel never

affects the final product.
Solar

Solar cells can only convert a small portion of the sunlight which

strikes then into electricity -- a maximum of 27X with gallium arsenide

cells, and up to 25X with silicon cells.

under present technological understanding.

These are theoretical upper limits
Photovoltaics generally operate

with conversion efficiencies between 10 and 15 percent.
lover the efficiency, the more cells

electricity.

needed

Of course, the

to produce the same amount of

At present, a house using 500 kWh each month would need a
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photovoltaic array of about 220 square feet Cat 15 ¾ efficiency> to provide

its power.

The roofs on most single-family houses could easily accommodate

such an array, according to Maycock and Stirewalt. 35

Industrial buildings

often have tremendous unused expanses of roof-space; although I have not
seen studies documenting the ratio of electricity needs to the area of

available roofing, I would venture to guess that most industrial complexes

would be able to supply a large proportion of their power from photovoltaics

without using any ground space.
Centralization

American electricity generation in the 20th Century has been dominated

by centralized power-producing facilities.

Coal, oil, natural gas, hydro

electric, and nuclear plants all operate more efficiently on a large scale

than on a small scale.

Fuel is cheaper when purchased in large quantities,

and the turbines which convert steam into electricity operate far more

cheaply in large facilities.

Photovoltaics represent the first significant

challenge to centralized power generation, for they operate equally well in
small and large formats.

A million photovoltaic arrays produce the same

amount of electricity at the same fuel cost whether they are all sited in a

huge centralized desert field or on a million residential rooftops.

If we

were to produce all of our electricity with photovoltaics, it would require

2-4¾ of the land area of the United States to do so. 36

But if we used

rooftops instead of precious land, we would have only minimal land require
ments for solar power.

Thus photovoltaics are highly flexible in their
t<U ;
format and capabilities. They can be sized to the end-use requirements as

no other energy system can. 37

One of the maJor issues in centralized versus decentralized generating

facilities has to do with waste heat.

A coal-fired plant which can generate

1000 MW actually produces 2250 KW of energy -- but 1250 NW of that energy is

..

•
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lost as waste heat.

A nuclear fission plant loses twice as much heat as it

produces in electricity -- i. e. , a plant of the same 1000 NW capacity vents
2000 MW of waste heat to the atmosphere t 38

Central-station plants have no

useful means for containing and distributing that heat, since much of it is
considered •1ow grade industrial• heat.

( These plants � cogenerate

electricity by forcing the excess heat - as steam - through turbines. >

recently devised format, though, homeowners can capture much of the heat

In a

lost from photovoltaic systems and use it to heat or cool their homes.

Since space heating has always been an expensive part of American living
expenses, it is common sense to make use of this radiant energy.
Another interesting difference betwen centralized and decentralized

power generation is in the transportation of electricity from the generator
to the end-user.

What are known as transmission costs may be broken down

into two categories: a) power losses due to line inefficiencies, thermal

conductivity, and the like, and b ) capital costs intrinsic in the design,

construction, and operation of the various components of transmission and

distribution equipment.

It should be noted that there is no theoretical

correlation between large power plants and high voltage transmission.
Transmission losses are calculated by measuring the amount of

electricity produced by the generator at its Juncture with transmission

equipment, and comparing that with the cumulative metered electricity of all

customers.

According to Bob Perry of the Electric Power Research Institute,

the average loss from generator to customer is about 7X ( of the total

generator output ) - namely 3X in transmission and 4X in distribution. 39

There seem to be no •per mile• statistics for actual line loss, but two

maJor factors are essential in making any calculations: voltage and

distance.

Higher voltages create lower losses, while greater distances of

transmission increase losses.

In the plains states, for example, power

•

•
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losses may exceed

15¾,

22

due to the combined negative effect of these factors.

Most centralized solar systems now being pondered are not of the magninuclear and coal power plants; thus they would not be

tude of today ' s

capable of generating very high voltages.

Furthermore, most of these photo

voltaic fields are destined for desert or otherwise vacant locations (since

these fields require large expanses of land), which are invariably quite

distant from the customer.

Losses would be considerable in this format.

But power losses account for only part of transmission costs.

One

aspect of these added burdens is the oft-ignored role of 9onstructicn.

According to the 1970 National Power Survey, 40 construction costs for power
lines ranged from $77, 400 to $331, 000 per mile !

The 1975 Statistics of

Publicly Owned Electric Utilities in the United States provides the basic

data for the calculation of an average upkeep cost of nearly $3000 per mile
(per year), and about 10. 3X of production plant upkeep costs for the trans

mission plant. 41

These figures vary, of course, in different regions of the

country; construction in desert areas, for instance, is more difficult, and
thus more expensive.

Total transmission costs, then, are between 20-25¾ of

total electricity costs for small customers (i. e. , residential), and

approximately 30X for large (industrial > customers. The resulting costs are

not ones anybody, especially capital-strapped utilities, can afford to pay

for new generation capacity. 42

What shall we conclude from these facts?

First, we could advocate the

construction of either larger, or a greater number of, central station power

plants in order to increase the voltage and decrease the distance of power
lines.

But this solution hardly solves the energy problem the U. S. faces.

A second alternative might be to rewire longer power lines to carry more

efficient DC power <as is being done in a few places in the U. S. > or to run
longer trunk lines with 800 kilovolts or more of AC electricity, thus

reducing the necessary lengths of some feeder transmission and distribution
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lines.

This alternative has run into many grass-roots problems due to con

-

cerns over radiation, a�ic;:s, right - of-way, a.nd land-ownership consider

ations.

Ultra-high-voltage power line design will, in all probability, have

to be rethought before the public will accept it.

A third and final alter

native is to look into decentralized power sources, which require little or

no transmission and distribution equipment.

Photovoltaics are a highly

flexible form of electricity generation ; when such seemingly benign aspects

of electricity production as transmission costs are brought into the

picture, the merits of their decentralization also become quite obvious.

The research and development needed to advance this technology to a level of

feasibility deserves federal funding and media attention.
Economics

In this sub-section I would like to take up three intertwined aspects

of the conomics of the three technologies in question: initial capital

investment, economies of scale, and long-term issues.
Nuclear

As we have seen, nuclear power plants can produce large amounts

of electricity with small amounts of fuel.

To do this efficiently and

safely, these generation plants must be designed and built to very exacting

standards.

The reactor core must be contained in a shell of solid steel

over a foot thick, and a complex monitoring station must be installed to

verify the proper functioning of a great variety of machinery, pumps, and
valves.

The typical nuclear generation station requires a construction time

dollars.

During the time in which it is being built, it can offer no return

of seven to 12 years, at a cost of generally more than $1 billion in current

on the investment, and the high cost of borrowing capital further delays the

break-even date when the plant will be able to turn a profit.

If the

building operation were to go smoothly and the start-up procedures flaw-

)
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lessly, the plant would operate in the red C at a loss> for up to 20 years,
during which time it would slowly repay the cost of its construction.

Un

fortunately, plants already completed have had poor records of operation.

A number of plants now have had cracked reactor shells, brittle steam pipes,

and a score of other problems (including leakage of radiation).

The average

plant has an operating efficiency well below 50¼ because of extended down

time for repairs and testing. 43

As these problems

are

remedied in existing

plants, those under construction have to contend with new technologies, new

regulations (as imposed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission), and new
costs.

According to a number of utility officials across the nation,44

nuclear power plants completed since 1981 or so will repay their construc
tion costs only after 30-40 years.

To an economist thinking in the long run, this may not sound too

terrible.

But there is a catch, a missing piece of data: nuclear power

plants have an expected lifetime of 35- 40 years, and many plants have been

shut down indefinitely after only 10 or 15 years due to insurmountable

technical problems.

This does not bode well for the nuclear industry.

If a

plant has a theoretical profit-making lifetime of a maximum of ten years, as

implied above, then its construction is an economic absurdity , the oppor-

tunity costs of the plant are simply overwhelming at that point.

--------

·-

The dis-

count rate undermines the value of such a plant to such an extent that the

term •profit-making• is quite out of place.

The Congressional Quarterly

Almanac for 1982 estimates that the U. S. government will be spending upwards

of $24 billion a year for the completion, and upkeep of plants built during

this decade. 4 5

The government has subsidized a number of nuclear power

plant proJects, including the Washington Public Power Supply System <which

is discussed in considerable detail below ) and the Tennessee Valley Author-

ity plants.

Judging by the number of utilities which have had to default

•

•
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on the plants they were b�ilding, 46 that amount is likely to increase even

if no more plants are completed.

average economic lifetime of

30

A recent government report assumes an

years for American fission and coal-fired

power plants,47 suggesting that many plants will never turn a profit.

If a 1 200 KW nuclear power plant were to be constructed now, with a

planned start-up date in 1995, its builders could expect the initial capital

investment to be about $ 5. 3 billion. 4 8
for

30

If the plant operated continuously

years, and had to pay off its construction costs at 12¾ interest

rates ( with an average rate of inflation of

plant would be $5. 3 billion * (1

lifetime.

+

5 ¾),

then the total cost of the

. 07)** 30 = $40. 3 billion over its

This does not take into account a likely operating efficiency of

about 30¾. 4 9 <Note that interest rates now account for as much as

the total cost of new nuclear power plants. ) 50

duced

2. 4

25- 30¾

If the 1200 KW plant pro

of

billion kWh per year <which is only a little above the national
1 26 billion kWh per fission plant per year), 5 1 and sold the

average of

2.

per year.

Over 30 years, it would gross $3. 8 billion.

power at an average of $. 06 per kWh,52 it would gross almost $1 28 million

$36. 5 billion to pay off.

But that leaves

Unless these calculations are off b1 an or.cf.er of

magnitude, there seems little economic hope for nuclear power. 53

While the economics of coal do not present the frightening statis

tics of nuclear notoriety, there is a strong parallel to be seen between
the two technologies.

build.

Coal-fired plants usually require

5 -10

years to

Since there are no special procedures required for protecting

against melt-downs or radioactivity leaks, the cost per kilowatt of power

is significantly less than that for fission.

Since economies of scale are

not as pronounced in the use of coal, the average facility is considerably

smaller than the typical nuclear plant as well: about

current 924 KW capacity for nuclear.

500

KW instead of the

As discussed above, though, coal-fired
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generators require large capital investments for pollution control, usually
at a cost equal to the expenditures for the power plant itself.

According

to the previously cited government report comparing coal and nuclear plant

costs, a 1200 KW coal-fired plant using high-sulphur bituminous coal would

cost $3. 2 billion dollars, while a plant using lower-sulphur sub-bituminous

would cost about $100 million less. 54

Both of these plants would require

up to a billion dollars in pollution control equipment, despite the differ

ing sulphur content of their fuels.

It should also be noted that, over a

30-year lifetime, scrubbing equipment would need to be rebuilt entirely at

least once, thus hiking operation and maintenance costs significantly. 55

If we use the model employed for nuclear power in the preceding dis

cussion, we find that a 1200 MW high-sulphur coal plant incurs a total cost
of $24. 3 billion over 30 years.

If the plant generates 1. 26 billion kWh per

year and sells that power at $. 06 per kWh over 30 years, 56 then its gross

revenue is about $230 million, only 9X of the total plant costs.

Further

more, high pollution control costs are linked to coal availability:

About 80 per cent of the coal mined in the United States
comes from fields east of the Kississippi, but eastern reserves
make up only 45 per cent of the nation ' s total. Western coal, on
the average, has a much lower sulfur content - some of it 0. 6 to
0. 7 per cent - than eastern coal, much of which is in the 2 to 4
per cent sulfur range. Eastern coal, however, usually has a
higher BTU content than western coal.
But western coal is
currently in increasing demand because it allows utilities and
industrial users to more easily meet U. S. government air quality
standards, which limit sulfur emissions. 57

One wonders how long power plants on the east coast can afford to transport

resources from the vest and still provide electricity at feasible costs.

Solar

For the homeowner, an investment in photovoltaics at present costs

would be a tremendous undertaking.

If a family uses about 25, 000 kWh per

year, 58 then a photovoltaic system of about 10 kWp would be needed.

The total

installed cost of such a system, not including battery storage or power

inversion equipment (to convert the DC power produced by the cells into more

•
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useful AC) , vould be nearly $20, 000.

In other vords, the initial capital

investment of residential solar electric generation has very high oppor
t�ty costs.

The cost of replacing relatively cheap fossil-fuel-fired

electricity vith solar is entirely infeasible.

--

But there are two factors which can be weighed against the opportunity

costs argument: taxes and payback periods.

First, taxes:

President Carter

instituted a tax package during his administration which provided credits

for installations of solar and conservation measures in homes and busi

nesses.

A number of states passed legislation to add additional credits; in

"ichigan, for example, the combined federal and state credit allowed the

homeowner to recover 50¾ of the cost of any alternative energy measure.

In

Arizona and California, the credits could reach 60¾ of the initial capital

investment.

Therefore, a $20,000 photovoltaic system might only require $8 -

10,000 after taxes.

(The initial capital outlay would still be $20,000;

most homeowners would require loans to be able to do this. >

Unfortunately,

the Reagan administration has not extended the tax credit legislation, and,

if nothing is done, the federal credits will expire in 1986.

Some state

incentives will remain beyond that date, but the dual credits will probably

be needed to spark interest in investing in solar energy.

The other economic benefit of installing photovoltaics <or any other

solar system) is what is termed the •payback period. •

Since the fuel needed

for solar power is basically free, one can gradually recover the initial
cost from the fuel savings over what would have been required for using
traditional fossil fuels.

If a family pays $1000 per year in electricity

bills, and spends $15,000 for a photovoltaic system, it can consider itself

to have paid for the system in 15 years.

period.

That amount of time is the payback

After that period, the system provides a profit in comparison with

the electricity bills the family had been, and would otherwise be, paying.

•

•
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In other words, as the price of coal - and nuclear-fired electricity in

creases, �his sort of opportunity cost increases as wel� and photovoltaics
become an increasingly profitable investment.

These figures account only for res�al systems.

If a utility

wanted to install a large-scale solar generating field, the economics would

be somewhat different.

First of all, there is the issue of land.

According

to one source, if a utility wanted to generate the equivalent of 1000 NW

peak capacity <the largest photovoltaic field to date is l NW, so this level
is a long way off) , it would need to purchase 13, 000 acres of land -- land

which could not realistically be used for any other purpose. 59

$200 an acre, this would necessitate an expense of $2. 6 million.

an acre, 813 million would be needed for the land alone.

If land cost
At $1000

The cost of the

system itself would not be significantly different than that for a homeowner
on an installed peak kilowatt basis.

While wholesale purchasing power for

various aspects of the system (cells, storage, and power conditioning

equipment, for instance ) would certainly reduce the initial investment, both
the lack of federal tax credits and the tremendous losses in transmission

and distribution of the electricity (as discussed above) would tend to make

the costs at least as high on a large scale as on a small one.

There are some economic issues with regard to centralized and decen

tralized photovoltaic systems which have not been resolved, and they deserve
mention:

First, there is a significant worry over whose expense a photo

voltaic system would be.

Capital strapped utilities would not mind, at

least theoretically, homeowner purchase of decentralized arrays.

But the

high initial investment required for photovoltaic systems would probably

cause homeowners to hesitate.

Intuitively, since buying a system often

means controlling its use, utilities would want to buy whatever they could

afford, regardless of generating scale.

(

for co-ownership of rooftop cells.

In the end, utilities might push

But experience is minimal in this area.

7
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There is also the issue of resale value.

If homeowners install their

own systems and the systems have problems, the value of the house to a po- �

tential buyer would be reduced.

If solar electricity proves highly reliable

(which they generally have thus far) , resale values could be expected to

increase.

Several states presently consider solar installations of any sort

to be home improvements, and thus the value of the house would increase - as

would its property taxes.

As far as the utilities are concerned, if a

photovoltaic system does not increase the resale value of the house, •then

the economics for the homeowner in installing the photovoltaic systems are
questionable. •60

Tax issues also present economic and legal worries, especially for

potential small generators.

For instance, can legislators consider the

power produced and consumed by a household to be some form of income?

Likewise, how would the credits received from power companies for excess

power sold back be taxed?

Could an owner of a solar system claim depre

ciation as he or she might for other assets?

Uncertainty abounds in these

matters, and it probably discourages many interested people from investing

in photovoltaic systems.

A final economic problem is that of economies of scale. There cer
�tainly exists a basic power-producing economy of scale for fossil fuels, but
this issue is quite unclear for photovoltaics.

It is possible, for example,

that storage for night-time and poor weather is more easily accomplished on

a large scale, with many thousands of batteries in one place.
sure of this yet.

maintenance.

No one can be

Similarly, there may be significant economies of scale in

Providing maintenance for many systems scattered over the

--------

landscape may be a severe difficulty if homeowners cannot be trained or mo· vated to do basic repairs.

Having all of the arrays together cuts down on

travel, the necessity to deal with different companies' systems, and perhaps

•
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Homeowners may be unsatisfied

the number of workers needed to do the work.

on rooftop systems and may

with having to provide their

hesitate to invest in the technology until issues of this sort are clari
fied.

The data are not in, and the experience is too limited.

There may be

other, as yet unknown, economies, or diseconomies, of scale, which may only

arise following years of actual experience. Overall, it is difficult

claim that photovoltaics are at

resent cost - effective.

to7
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Politics and Policy

Energy policy in the United States has long been a controversial issue,

and few administrations have dealt with energy production and consumption

forthrightly and prudently.

In this subsection I shall once again alter the

format of the discussion, for in the political sphere the three technologies
Nuclear policy is only an ex

under consideration cannot be kept distinct.

treme case of the centralized infrastructure which governs coal and other

traditional non-renewable fuel sources.

Solar energy has been promoted

sparingly, indeed by only one administration in American history, suggestive

of the same mindset so pervasive in the area of energy regulation as a

whole. In the following discussion, I shall refer primarily to nuclear

power, arguing that its prominence in American public policy is yet another
strong argument for a prudent rethinking of our energy priorities.

I shall

discuss these _!!:>ur co�rns: a) the capture theory of government, b) ecoL

�

nomic determinism, c) regulatory procedures, and d) the prudence argument of

our prisoner's dilemma.

The typical policy decision - making process <see
7

figure) represents a cycle which is intended to maintain a stable democratic
government.

As we shall see, in some cases this process is conveniently

ignored or circumvented; in others it fails to account for all of the issues

and interests involved.

7
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..
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In an article comparing the governmental structures of the U. S. and

v.>A- ?

France in terms of nuclear power, Jack Barkenbus suggests that tqis process
-z:::,,

has too many •access points• for public disapproval of nuclear power for any

policy to get anywhere. 61

In the 1960's and early 1970 ' s, the public

generally supported atomic energy and there were very high growth rates in

electricity demand.

The Atomic Energy Commission was the central policy

maker, and had a three-part role : promotion, research and development, and
regulation.

7

The AEC was minimally affitcted by Congress, and the Courts had

__,

little interest in the issue at that time.

Thus the AEC had a free rein

in handling the future of America ' s energy generation.

In its two-faced

role of promotion and regulation, no good offer was refused, and the regula
tory function of the agency was all but lost. 6_:ring this period, the

policy process faileJ Most of the checks and balances intrinsic to the
system were undermined, and only a few interest groups were favored.

This

was an excellent example of the •capture theory• of governmental agencies,

whereby the government's interests become those of the industry, and the /

personnel in the high ranks of each become almost interchangeable.

The political environment in the latter 1970's was quite different.

Congress finally realized that promotion and regulation have to be

separated, and the Nuclear Regulatory Agency was formed for the latter

function, while transferring the R&D duties to the Department of Energy

{

/

..
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and to the industry itself.

Through this move, more governmental bodies

were included in the policy - making process, and more interest groups were

given access as well.

The courts began taking an interest in energy policy;

Congress passed regulations concerning the freedom of electric utilities in

the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act C PURPA> and others; many Congres

sional committees and subcommittees were formed; state governments initiated

their own legislation and challenged that of the federal government; and

environmental groups started serious campaigns against nonrenewable energy

sources in general, and nuclear power in particular.

All of this, on top of the economic recession in the coal and nuclear

industries, served to slow the momentum of the •electrification program•

which had once promised almost free electricity.

Barkenbus describes the

French governmental structure as quite rigid, by comparison, in its linear

and uncompromising pattern. The French Atomic Energy Commission (CEA) has

the power of our old AEC; the CEA can dictate policy recommendations to the
Parliament itself.

As the nuclear industry is government-owned in France,

the competitive interests of utjJ..i±.y companies are nonexistent, and very

little access is provided to the �c itself.

This •1ron triangle• of

policy making is incompatible with the U. S. system, for we rely on the

--

balancing views of the public in the vast maJority of our policy decisions.
As Marc Roberts, a political scientist at the Argonne Labs, has said,

• our institutions were designed to resolve confli'7:;""\ promote the repre

sentation of diverse interest, and respect the vi� of committed minor -

ities.

They were not intended to produce economically efficient schemes of

resource allocation. •

Alan Stone, similarly, reflects that •if there is a

will to delay, there is usually a way to do it. •62

In sum, the policy

process in this country works to prevent large scale development in any
direction, be it renewable or fossil fuel.

It forces us into an incremental

mode of decision making, regardless of whether that mode is needed, bene-

7

•

•
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ficial, or useful. 63

Another part of this decision-making process has to do with what might

-

be called the •policy• of economic determinis,JJL.

Many environmental writers

advocate the reliance on the market system for the development of approp-

riate energy technologies.

It is their view that the cost of non - renewable

resources will increase to the point that there will be no choice but to
explore alternative energy sources, simply due to the law of supply and

demand.

Amory Lovins, for instance, maintains that when the government

supports R&D in alternative energy, it is more likely to hurt the effort

than to help it, in part because of its emphasis on large-scale, centralized

energy generation, and also because of its inability to deal with proJects
on a small economic scale - independent of the scale of generation. 6 4

Of course, it is especially harmful to the alternative energy movement

t'
when th
ernment subsidizes another energy source, and worst of all
�
nuclear. The Clinch River Breeder Reactor Demonstration ProJect in

Tennessee was a prime example of extravagant government R&D spending on a

fruitless proJect.

Billions of dollars were pumped into the Clinch River

proJect, and nothing ever came of the proJect; Congress finally killed the
proJect in mid-198 3 .

President Reagan ' s advocacy of this proJect, thought,

was a contradiction of his •policy• of leaving energy decisions up to the

marketplace.

Such a policy might have worked if applied consistently; in

his attempt to disregard the policy-making process and proceed through

alternate routes he failed to address the serious problems at hand.

Reagan ' s •philosophy• also has an element of disregard for the impor

tance of regulatory procedures governing the energy industry, which is only

an extreme version of the views taken by past administrations.

another international comparison as an example :

Let us take

The CANDU light-water

reactor system used for electricity generation across Canada has never been
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subJect to the same kind of uproar our nuclear reactor designs have.
this so?

Why is

What is it about the Canadian political system that has saved the/

from detractors ?

One likely reason is Canada ' s emphasis on •regulation by

�

results, • which requires plants to demonstrate their capability to handle
safety problems before getting officially licensed. Canadian nuclear generating facilities are prohibited from operating prior to these rigorous tests
of design and operating personnel.

American plants must only comply with

sometimes untested legislated details, not demonstrated operating standards.
The Canadian policy could certainly be applied to all new and experimental
energy systems as well as those accepted by traditional standards.
Finally, there is an important link between nuclear power policy and
the resource constraints of the natural world. �e sort of analysis must
be done to estimate, perhaps qualitatively, whether the policy decisions of
our country are moving us in the right directi� No one can deny that
nuclear power has been intended to supply America ' s long-term energy future:
our policy Judgments clearly have a long term environmental future.

Thus,

we might wonder whether solutions have been found to the maJor problems with
nuclear power - on the technological, economic, and policy levels.

Against

that question, we need to investigate the potential policy outcomes
depending on whether our policies take us in the direction of nuclear or
solar.

What does the result look like?

The table below looks a bit like

the philosopher ' s favorite: Pascal ' s wager concerning the belief in, and
the existence of, God.

In Pascal ' s wager, one only seriously •loses• the

wager if one believes in God and He turns out not to exist. Here, humankind
"loses• most seriously if we invest in nuclear energy without a long term
solution to the problems of the energy source :

�1--.�-n-.�
��--U-

.. �:·

J

•

•
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This variant on the prisoner's dilemma is, in essence, an argument for

prudence -- for the wise choice of energy systems to carry us into a sus

tainable future.

As we have seen in the diverse arguments above, sometimes

-

directly and sometimes by default, solar electric technologies provide the

hope for a future which nonrenewable fuels cannot begin to promote.

What is

needed is to begin pushing for technological, economic, and political ad

---::;::::;:z-

vances in photovoltaics, so that we can be well on our way to sustainability

before nuclear and coal-fired systems run out of fuel.

But how do we

inspire such change, and what steps can we take to see it through?

Part I I

ome of the ethical systems and visionary possibilities which might

b

n bringing about energy sustainability.
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Part I I: Ethical Foundations for a Solar Future
As we have seen, the advantages of photovoltaics, and of solar energy

in general, far outweigh those of coal -fired or nuclear power plants; photo
voltaics can thus be said to be a superior form of electricity generation.

Nevertheless, our society is powered by the latter two types of energy.

Electric utility companies have a long - standing control on the power gr�d,
and they have shown little interest in change.

As homeowners we pay the

utilities for the electricity which we use, and when they want to charge us

a higher rate for that use we tend not to be included in the decision-making

process; instead, the utility appeals to an administrative and regulatory

agency composed of appointed officials who supposedly represent the public

interest.

The current system is heavily dependent on centralized ewer.

Why is this the case?

If photovoltaics are so clearly superior, why do

they not cover rooftops across America?

(or even known> by the American public?

Why are they not widely accepted
We have accepted telephones,

computers, and air transportation with relative ease; why can we not do the

same with a new efficient form of energy generation?

Perhaps we accept

innovations only if an immediate economic incentive can be garnered by

adopting them.

But it seems that if a new technology shows clear signs of

importance, the short-term gains should exercise less influence.

There is

no question that solar cells are important; that is not the problem.

But do

they offer a clear immediate econgmic gain1
The answer is clearly �

For photovoltaics to become economically

viable, as we have seen, the cost of producing silicon cells must drop by an

order-of-magnitude so that they can reasonably compete with traditional

nonrenewable sources of energy.

Additionally, they must be mass-produced,

packaged in usable ways, and a non-toxic, long - lasting form of storage must
be developed to store the electricity the cells produce.

But there are

..
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other important factors to

be

considered in the adoption of photovoltaics.

While this technology does not presently offer large economic gains, or even

promise widespread feasibility for the immediate future, we have seen that
it merits serious consideration.

A strong argument can be made that the

/ adoption of solar cells is a proper course of action for a national energy
\ strategy, that this technology ought to be used.

Thus there is a discrep

ancy between what people are likely to do and what it appears they should

---

The

do; a careful analysis is then in order to sort

analysis of the basis for proper actions is the domain of ethics.

Thus,

because of both the importance and the short-term economic unlikelihood of

photovoltaics, the question of their adoption is ethical in nature.

Part II

of this thesis is devoted to a discussion of some of the moral dimensions of
the debate over the production and use of energy.

Many ethical themes have been raised in the environmental and alterna

tive energy contexts, but one of the most interesting and insightful con

cerns our obligations to future generations.

If one is serious about

achieving some level of sustainability, one is necessarily concerned with
the people who will inhabit such a society.
I I.

This topic is the focus of Part.

To begin with, we shall see how the classical schoola of ethical

thought deal with this ieaue, for these schools provide universal Justifi

cations for ethical standards of all sorts.

We shall then be able to see

ways in which a synthesis of all of these views might provide a useful

framework for discussions of future generations.

Finally, we shall look at

two of the failings of traditional ethical thinking, with respect to the

importance of human nature in ethical assessments and the centrality of
vision.

The issue of our obligation to future generations is not a simple one.

Some philosophers argue that we do not have any such obligations, for our
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fair treatment will never be repaid.

We do not even knov the people ve

{JV

,�

�

w,J·. ._�

vould be helping toward a better life; thus there is no moral or economic
incentive to provide anything for them, be it resources, information, or
technology.

We have an even smaller incentive to sacrifice anything for the

benefit of future generations.

This kind of argument could be called the

•what has posterity ever done for me?• perspective. 65
But there is considerable agreement in the bulk of the literature on
ethics that present generations owe something to the future, that posterity·
has at least !2:!!!!, claims on our behavior.

A fev writers suggest that all ve

owe to the future - and even to our own children - is the freedom to explore
the environment as ve have been able to, as well as the opportunity to live
a good life. 66

Other writers see the problem as considerably more involved,

vith many variables and many possible outcomes.

This is vhere the classical

schools of ethical thought become pertinent, for the ultimate Justification

of our actions is called into question. · The three large schools focus moral
Justification on three different factors: the consequences of an action
(consequentialism & utilitarianism), the nature and characteristics of the
action itself (deontolo

>, and the person undertaking the action (agent or

school of thought and the difficulties each may face.
Utilitarianism
Probably the most popular version of consequentialism is utilitarianism, due largely to John Stuart Mill's book by that name. 67

To over-

simplify matters somewhat, ut'l't
. .
. d in the motto •the
1 1 ar1an1sm
can�
summarize
greatest good for the greatest number•: we must maintain and increase the
happiness of as many people as possible.

While there is another facet to

this catch-all motto, let us look at it in this form for the moment.
If the greatest good is the happiness of the greatest number, then ve
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certainly have to parcel out the means to happiness in an extraordinarily

stringent manner.

Why?

Because the greatest number includes those of us

alive nov - nearly five billion people - and all those vho vill be alive in

the year 2020, for instance - perhaps eight billion - and all of the

possible people whose very existence is contingent on the actions we take

today and on the actions taken by a future generation in the year 2020.

energy is�primary means to happiness and pleasure that it has long been
assumed to be, then whatever resources ve have nov must be conserved for

their future use.

The greatest number of people vho would use those

resources are not yet born; our 4. 8 billion .people hardly compare in number

to the eight billion expected in a few decades.

Therefore, utilitarianism

would seem to suggest that severe rationing of fossil fuels should commence

immediately and that the development of renewable resources should receive

top priority.

It is not a matter of incentives but of moral necessity.

�-'

Utilitarianism seems to imply, further, that the greatest number sho ld
�
exist to take pleasure in whatever happiness is available -- that bigger is

better.

The motto as it stands suggests an assumption that equal moral

weight is given to all people68 and a conclusion that the greatest good

future and possible people will desire it Just as we do. chis reveals a

,/

assessed in utilitarianism) It seems quite able to account for present

actions among present people, but the calculus required to assess the

desires of the future give this school pause in its ethical evaluations.

Nov let us add that third facet to the motto: ·The greatest good for

the greatest number over the greatest period of time.• Does the time factor

change anything?

The •greatest period of time,• taken to its logical (and

physical) extreme, is eternity.

And it is that very eternity of which we

l)

��

will have to be carefully rationed in the present under the expectation that

significant disparity between the way present and future people are

(1)
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.ti

speak when we argue about future generations: as Annette Baier suggests,

they are unknowable, indeterminate, and contingent. 69

Because of these

uncertainties, because we can know so little about our great-grandchildren,
we would expect this school of thought to be cautious in its apparent

generosity to t�e future.

But the motto of utilitarian ethics seems to

suggest that no limits need be placed on the number of humans or the extent

of time during which this greatest good is available.

terms reflect an interest in maximums and not optimums.

In other words, its

In a finite world,

V,
�
we are causing our O'!(!l extinction whenever we base our ethical, politica� "..,;_
(' f-o:_I" ..,,..,..,,.
rf';uh�
and economic actions (such as cost-benefit analysis> on such maximums. V v--t'�
j

��1� ��

Additionally, there is the problem of convincing present people to ac�
;
�
on the behalf of the future. As Norman Care contends in an article on this
�
subJect, it is very difficult for present humans to be motivated to be

concerned about people who are in no way knowable, whom even their great

grandchildren will not know.

Future people Cas opposed to •possible•

people; see above> are at best potentially knowable, as their lives could

overlap with present generations or with •knowable• generations. 70

Care

states that •people as we know them are not, and cannot be expected to be,

motivated by 'a concern for generations to come' to act upon what morality
requires for the world of the future. •7 1

Peter Wenz responds that •no form of utilitarianism which excludes

pos;!,!-ble people in its calculations can supply an adequate standard of

evaluation for alternative energy policies.

such policies can affect

will exist. •72

In sum, the choices between

we care
Regardless of
�about, present, certain future, or possible future, people,�o have an

!]le

ethical obligation to leave the world in a clean enough and safe stat.;)

Would that future generations may inhabit that world without suffering

�
:
�
:�

unnecessary health risks or fearing the perils of a nuclear explosion due to
the mismanagement of one of 2.!!!:. decommissioned generating facilities or
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waste disposal sites.

<It is interesting to note that cost-benefit analy

ysis, the procedure which would typically be used to determine which policy

is •best• for the likes of nuclear power plant safety, is characterized as a

utilitarian, or consequentialist, decision-making process. These analyses

weigh the costs and benefits of the likely results of the action to be
taken.)

There is no doubt, finally, that the consequences of our actions

must be weighed in an ethical evaluation, but utilitarianism is hard pressed

to account for that which it cannot know.

v·

Deontology

Where does deontology stand on the issue of future generations?

cussion on this topic is somewhat speculative.

Dis

Immanuel Kant, the o �al

spokesman for this school of thought, once said, •the future is not one of

my concerns. •73

This school of thought is not primarily concerned with the

effects or consequences of an act, but with the action itself.

As Bernard

Williams suggests, •surely !Q!!. actions, compatibly with consequentialism,

might have intrinsic value?•74 The basic deontological principle for deter

mining right action can be stated as follows:

•An action is morally right

if and only if it is the action required by a duty that is at least as

strong as any other duty in the cirumstances. •75

Kant contended that the

nature of moral standards must be universal and consistent.

promise, one is morally committed to keep it.

If one makes a

�

Deontological ethics is often referred to as •obligation• or •duty•� � ·
J
c,;vv�- .,....t,.,-ethics: we have an intrinsic obligation to treat each other morally. This�� P ,..,
A,..,..

raises the question: what is our duty - and to whom is our duty to be

directed - in terms of the use of scarce resources?

ecolo

Consider the model of

In addition to evolutionary change, genetic diversity, and preda-

tor-prey relationships, one of ecology 's most significant tenets has to do

f

v-"-_,;;, �

,,,. 1-j

with •limits to growth.•
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When a population of organisms finds a large

supply of food or forage, it can devote more of its own biological energy to

reproduction.

shrink.

As the population grows, the supply of energy resources must

At a certain point, the resource base cannot maintain the popula

tion, and one of three things will happen: the population can split into

smaller sub-populations and explore new resources, it can level off at what

is called the carrying capacity, or it can exceed that point through

mismanagement of resources and soon •crash• as organisms die of starvation.

Many species are subJect to these rules, and humankind is among them. ��
�
The obvious initial question is this: what does an ecological model

have to do with deontological ethics?

Ecology provides a context for

obligatory responsibilities in order to maintain the population growth rate��

��I.A,�.

at a level which can survive on the available resource base, or to monitor

\�

and protect the resource base so that the population may use it over a long

period of time.

As Gary Coates suggests in his Resettling America, •the

' limits to growth' debate is no longer about vhether it is possible (or

lJ.-11,1-

� �
�

er� �

�-a:-- __,

a»--�)·

/;}
-� . ',L_'
k- �.r�
lY

desirable) for infinite material growth to continue in a finite world.

Rather, it is about when, and how a transition can be made to a sustain

able••• society. •

As noted in The Ecologist, •the principal defect of the

industrial way of life with its ethos of expansion is that it is not sus
tainable. •76

In other words, ecology demonstrates in biological terms what

deontology might suggest for our crucial obligations to the future.
So what obligations does •deontological ecology• dictate?

list might be resource conservation.

First on the

7

We have an intrinsic duty, one could ��.
<
argue, to maintain our natural resource base for present and future genera- � �

tions alike.

F

:0,.

��:-

Another important duty we have (in resource use) is to develop�
,

and implement technologies which provide energy through unlimited resources:

sun, water, and wind.

This helps to maintain the base of nonrenevables we

1),,

,-e-,,-

,rv"

(;

J;v;.� f.C,

w-A �;
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�

have as well as to foster the longevity and sustainability of the planet and
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its inhabitants.

Future future human innovation certainly provides the

possibility for a •way out• of our seemingly inevitable scarcities; it

would not be wise, though, to bank on a potential we cannot anticipate.
But three interconnected questions

morally Justified in taking any single action?

this point.

First, are we

Deontology seems to suggest

that we have multiple duties to other people, that we have an obligation to

take as many steps as we are able in the name of sustainability.

While it

is proper to conserve energy by adding a second glazing to windows, one can
also install insulation, invest in solar equipment, and reduce energy con-

sumption.

Deontology would ask that we do all of these things. But the

multiple duties concept has another dimension as well:

Not only do we have

obligations to carry out multiple tasks in the present, but we have to

consider the multiplicity of time as well.

In other words, we have duties

tovard our fellow humans now Just as we do to those who do not yet exist and
/
whom we will never know. Deontology thus provides a counter to the appar- J

ently unbalanced bias toward the future in utilitarianism.

Second, it is not clear to whom these obligations are directed.

0hereas utilitarianism provides a clear directive to ensure the happiness of

all people, present and future, d�ology offers no significant requirelf'� ·

ments for the future

'

;rn fact, this school of thought could be said to

restrain present sacrifices to future generations, for the sake of those
/\

currently living.

The multiple duties ve have in energy conservation, for

instance, may be intended as much for the preservation of the biosphere as
for the sustainability for humankind.

This brings up the third question of Justification:

of an intrinsic obligation to non-existent people?

such an obligation be made?

How can we speak

One what basis would

It seems to me that the consequences of our

present actions have a clear bearing on the well-being of future flora and

�f

��

�

�

�

fauna, humans included.

deontological standard.
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And a concern for consequence does not qualify as a

Thus I would argue that there is no intrinsic value

in conserving present resources for future sustainability.

consequential grounds is necessary to support such an ethic.

An argument on
In terms of

future generations, neither utilitarianism nor deontology alone offer a

clear and concrete perspective on how, and for whom, we must act ethically.
Agent Ethics

The final school of thought I vant to address is that known as •agent•

or •virtue• ethics

-

for it is concerned vith a Justification based on the

character (or virtue) of the person (or agent) carrying out an ethical

action.

�

This school has its roots in the writings of Aristotle, but its

�

revival has been quite recent in comparison with the former two schools.

The agent perspective sets forth a different kind of question: ·What kind of

humans should we be?•

)

I

Robert Louden suggests that, instead of having principles and rules

about what moral actions an agent ought to do, •the concept of moral

ought ••• seems now to be explicated in terms of what the good person would

do. •77

In other words, moral actions must be based on such virtues as

truth, Justice, generosity, kindness, and the like; immoral actions have

their foundations in such vices as greed, envy, intolerance, and dishonesty.

Phillipa Foot, a noted contemporary philosopher, feels that a moral agent

performs on the basis of a direct desire, •without first believing that he

or she morally ought to perform that action or have that desire. •78

It

seems that humans are more likely to have an intuitive sense about whether

they are being honest or kind than about whether they have a particular duty

to do something or not.
former than the latter.

One can be more certain, in most cases, about the

This emphasis on the agent, as opposed to the action, is significant in

1,
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many ways:

First, a virtue ethic downplays the decision-making process in a

given act; there are certain •long-term characteristic patterns of an

action• which seem to be more useful in ascertaining its morality.

Teleo

logical and deontological ethicists would appeal more readily to a practical

•determinate decision procedure• to solve a moral problem.

iss�e of motive.

Second is the

Where the deontological motive is moral duty or obli

gation, and where utilitarianism bases its actions on the maximization of

pleasure, agent ethics relies almost exclusively on the virtues themselves

in motivating moral actions.

As Louden notes, •the agent who correctly acts

from the disposition of charity does so••• not because it maximizes utility

or because it is one' s duty to do so, but rather out of a commitment to the

value of charity for its own sake. •79

H. Richard Niebuhr, in his classic work, The Responsible Self, dis

cusses these virtues in terms of •fitting• actions.

For Niebuhr ethics con

sists of a ser-ies of human responses to moral problems; •and for the ethics

of responsibility the fitting_action, the one that fits into a total inter
action as response and as anticipation of further response, is alone condu

cive to the good and alone is right. •8 0

In the •ethics of the fitting,•

we find ourselves led to the notion of universal responsibility,
that is, of a life of responses to actions which is always qual
fied by our interpretation of these actions as taking place in a
universe, and by the further understanding that there will be a
response to our actions by representatives of [the] universal
community, or by the generalized other who is universal, or by an
impartial spectator who regards our actions from a universal
point of view, whose impartiality is that of loyalty to the
universal cause. Bl

Finally, •the questions we raise about [responsive actions] are not only

those of their rightness or wrongness, their goodness or badness, but of

their fitness or unfittingness in the total movement . ••••82

These statements clearly give rise to the question of future genera

tions:

Where does the future stand for virtue ethics?

From Niebuhr' s
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comments, it is apparent that virtue ethics does have a stake in the future

of humanity, that •the kind of humans we want to be• is somehow related to
the way we bring up our children and imbue them with ethical foresight of

their own.

When Wendell Berry discusses the need for a •nurturing• culture

based on sustainable, organic agriculture, he clearly cares about the proper

patterns of character which will best maintain a •healthy community. •83

Along the same lines, the universal virtues in Christian ethics, including

love, honesty, kindness, and fairness, may be expressed in many different

ways, but they certainly share qualities of timelessness and universality
both inherent qualities of the future.

We can theorize, by extrapolation,

that a member of any culture on Earth is able to feel at least some

derivative of each one of these virtues; our children, we may also observe,

somehow •know• what it means to be honest, what it means to be fair.

If

these virtues are cross-cultural and inter-generational among living people,

it is reasonable to expect that they would be equally understood a thousand

years in the past and a thousand years in the future.

Based on what

literature we have from the past, this seems to hold in one direction; we

can only wait and see whether the future will reflect these patterns.

If everything were so straightforward, there would be a lack of moral

dilemmas among human beings.

complete and timeless harmony.

the vices.

But a few factors loom large in the path of

The first is the other side of the virtues:

We can look all the way back to Oedipus Rex and see clearly that

some of our more prevalent vices (i. e. , greed and envy> have been around for

a long time, and show no sign of waning.

The second issue has to do with

the environment surrounding the agent and his or her action.

As Richard

Bondi notes in ·The Elements of Character,• one's character is greatly

influenced by that environment:

Our subJection to the accidents of history means that
character•. • always has a context - perhaps several contexts
which offer rival interpretations of what events, circumstances,
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and the past itself might mean, and which calls us in different
directions into the future. One of the chief tasks of an ethics
of character, then, is delineating these multiple contexts and
their implications. 84

Ethical actions are most easily understood within their particular context,

within that set of events and circumstances which lead to what Niebuhr calls

a •responsive action. •

But this notion of context becomes considerably more

difficult to assess when the moral agent must be placed in a certain pers
pective along with the actions that agent takes.

It is probably not useful

to claim that a prostitute cannot take ethical a�tions in energy conserva

tion or be concerned about future generations simply by reason of being a
whore.

On a less crude level, it would not aid the movement toward ecolo

gical sustainability if only environmentalists are morally allowed to take

the proper actions in that direction.

Virtue ethics is at times in danger

of falling into this trap; prudence, if nothing else, dictates the

impracticality of that strategy.

A third and final problem with the �erspective of agent ethics on

future generations has to do with social versus internal ethics.' Virtue

ethics seems preoccupied with individual, internal morality; questions about
which action best displays human virtue are more central than those of

interpersonal, relational attributes.

Few proponents of a virtue ethic

asked the question: •How might humans best treat each other?•

If we are

concerned primarily with our own image we are failing to notice the special

obligations we have and the virtues we must use. I do not intend to engage

in an extended discussion on the matter; I only wish to suggest that •rela-

_tional• ethics deserves at least as much concern as •internal• ethics in the
virtue school of thought.

As the great Rabbi Hillel once said, •If I am not

for myself, who will be for me?

And if I am only for myself, what am !?•85

No one of these three perspectives has the final answer on whether we
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have, and how we are to act on, our obligations to future generations.

it does appear that these perspectives together have a great deal to say

about the ethical role humans have in consideration of the future.

But

While

)f;

deontology and consequentialism have long been viewed as foes, there is no

apparent reason why they, along with the virtue ethics school, cannot

instead complement each other 's perspective.

One must account for the

intrinsic duty of an action, along with the consequences of that action; and

to be truly moral, one must be sincere, honest, and for�hright in carrying

out that action.

In terms of our responsibility to the future, if we use

scarce natural resources today without considering the generations which

follow us, we are clearly ignoring what might be termed the inherent value

of conservation and solar energy and our duty of responsibility and steward

ship; we are, likewise, failing to consider the inevitable result of such a

policy (i. e. , the likely deterioration of health and quality of life) ; and

we are falling, among other things, into the vice of greed.

To phrase this

in a positive manner, one might say that an agent is moral if and only if he

or she takes intrinsic duty, consequence, and virtue into account.

The kind

of humans we want to be, then, are ones who do all of these things; to do

anything less is to be less than moral.

It is thus reasonable to look to a synthesis of the three schools for a

suitable ethical stand with respect to the more specific problem of energy

use.

For this specific problem, as for the closely related issues of eco

logical responsibility and obligations to future generations, what might be

called an ethic of prudence provides a standard of moral behavior.

Prudence

would permit our society to avoid the inevitable harm of impending resource

disasters.

Paths of action we can take which provide a means to prevent

ecological collapse, then, come under the heading of prudence.

By looking

at the implications of the three perspectives we have addressed, we can

conclude that it is prudent to act accprding to their accumulated standards
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in our efforts to provide a situation of sustainable energy for our grand-

children.

In other words, we are bound simultaneously by at least three

½,.

<

1

ethical requirements in or�o act prudently: Ye have a responsibility t�·

consider the future consequences of a present action, we have an intrinsic (� �

obligation of concern about the future, and we must act in such a way as to

., �J/1,-

reveal those virtues which demonstrate our care for that which has yet to�
happen.

(Note that prudence is here used within the context of energy use

c.
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and production; its applicability in other areas is not necessarily as

Given that scarce fossil fuels will someday fail us if we follow

obvious. >

our present energy strategy, it behooves us to wisely invest our time,

effort, and resources in the means toward an appropriate and sustainable
future.

la,.,,
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Thus we can make the moral claim that conserving scarce resources

and developing appropriate technologies based on renewable resources are

prudent actions.

If nothing else, prudence provides an ipso facto ethical

---

Justification for the investigation of alternative energy sources.

Thus far we have considered these ethical themes in the abstract,

largely without a specific context for their application.

crucial issues in this regard is human nature.

One of the most

If it is clear, as many

philosophers and political theorists have suggested, that humans have a

particular nature which is distinct from that of other animals, then that

nature is a necessary part of any ethical evaluation.

We have already seen

that human nature relates to ethical questions in our discussion of the

virtue ethics school of thought.

forth by th

If we look at the kinds of questions put

chool, Ye can see a broad concern for proper human charact
teristics.
eed, virtue ethics offers a concern about human nature which
the other schools of thought igno'j

The oft-mentioned query about "What

kind of humans ought we to be?• forms an appropriate foundation for some
large and difficult questions about the kind of humans we are and the

00
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elements of character we presently hold.

If we, as humans, are concerned about the proper way to treat each

other, we must know something about our nature.

We might ask a sea lion

about the proper way for sea lions to treat each other, but we ourselves are

in a ,poor position to comment on the issue because of our ignorance of sea

lion nature.

As Karx said, •to know what is useful for a dog, one must

study dog nature••..•86

.
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Far from what is sometimes considered a •natura

listic fallacy• (see Appendix) to link these issues, we may well have a
Naturalistic Imperative to examine ethics and human nature together.

If we

are to rely on our inherent virtues to guide our moral behavior in any way

as the agent school would suggest, then we clearly must exercise some faith

in, and gain some understanding of, those characteristics we call •human.•

But perhaps it is the pragmatic contribution of this perspective which

is most important in connecting ethics and nature.

If we are interested in

achieving positive change toward energy sustainability through moral per
suasion, our cause is advanced considerably further by promoting

ethic than one of an abstract nature.

have tvo primary facets: first, peo

A •workable ethic• may be said to
must accept the ethic as somehow

possible; in other words, it must be suitably connected with reality
that
�

they can imagine following its requirements.

must be doable

Second, a •workable ethic•

Not only should people see it as somehow reasonable, t�ey

must actually be able to do it themselve0 A utility official may state a
willingness to provide free solar heating systems for low-income residents
as a part of an ethically prudent energy strategy, but if the_utility c

<-

�

neither afford these systems nor find a willing manufacturer, then the et��:
�

has little usefulness.

R.E. Ewin, in his Co-operation and Human Values,

�

J---t_.-�-

seizes on the first half. of this duality in saying that ·human life•.• makes
presuppositions about human nature, and what it presupposes about human

nature is concerned with virtues and vices.

Moral philosophy consists

�
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largely of the development of an account of human nature. •87

If we accept, then, that •facts about our nature can have moral conse

quences,•88 and that there is a particularly human nature, ve can begin to

wonder what exactly this nature includes and what about it aids in the moral
quest for sustainability. 89

It seems to me that, beyond the usual rhetoric

about human consciousness, rationality, and so on, one of the key facets in

our nature is the way we view our place in the universe.

�-

_£ross-c;;ulturallY,

I would argue, humans see themselves as significant enough beings as to make

some sort of difference in the larger cosmos.

There is a peculiarly human

resonance to being a part of that larger universe; 90 those who share this

resonance have significant motivation. to live.

Human beings have universal

fears about, among other things, being lost (both physically and concep

tually> .

People fear being lost, they hate large uncertainties, and they

tend to dislike being confused.

It follows, then, that people rarely stray

from what they know and understand - from what they see as •familiar,•

empirically or vicariously.

One' s identity is based on what seems familiar,

and one's understanding, however dim, of the sense and purpose of the large

cosmos is shaped by these experiences.

If we wish to suggest a workable ethic, then, we would want to find

moral principles which a moral agent could, and would, follow.

And so we

come to the dual issues of ompatibility and vision: an ethical standard can

only •work• if its principles are compatible with the nature of its agents
and if sufficient vision is established to motivate those agents.

A require

ment that people cease consuming all food for the sake of future generations

would likely meet with some resentment, for it is poorly matched to the
needs of human beings.

Even to ask that

e reduce their electricity use

�

by one-half for a commensurately ethical end would neither be met with

enthusiasm nor, most likely, action.
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In contrast to compatibility, which refers to the rootedness of an

ethic in those who are to carry it out, vision plays a somewhat different
role.

Vision can be described in terms of

the future.

ftore

con-

cretely, it involves the creation of inspiring and lucid possibilities for

the future - or what I will call clarity.

For humans to be inspired about

that future, they must have some sense of what it is they seek: to discern

how to reach their goals.

Clarity also involves focussing one 's thoughts on

that future and its possibilities.

When a person is said to be •far

sighted,• this aspect of vision is clearly at work; farsightedness connotes

the ability to see specifically how that future offers an improvement over

the present situation.

Clarity ie the feeling that we want to get some

where, and the intuitive understanding about where that is.

C. S. Lewis, in his Mere Christianity, offers a wonderful perspective on

a great many of these issues.

He wonders what factors comprise the ethical

necessity of living, and concludes with a set of three components:

There are two ways in which the human machine goes wrong.
One is when human individuals drift apart from one another, or
else collide with one another and do one another damage, by
cheating or bullying. The other is when things go wrong inside
the individual - when the different parts of him (his different
faculties and desires and so on) either drift apart or interfere
with one another. You can get the idea plain if you think of us
as a fleet of ships sailing in formation. The voyage will be a
success only, in the first place, if the ships do not collide and
get in one another' s way; and secondly, if each ship is seaworthy
and has her engines in good order. As a matter of fact, you
cannot have either of these two things without the other. If the
ships keep on having collisions they will not remain seaworthy
very long. On the other hand, if their steering gears are out of
order _they will not be able to avoid collisions.
Or, if you
like, think of humanity as a band playing a tune. To get a good
result, you need two things. Each player 's individual instrument
must be in tune and also each must come in at the right moment so
as to combine with all the others.

But there is one thing we have not yet taken into account.
We have not asked where the fleet is trying to get to, or what
piece of music the band is trying to play. The instruments might
be all in tune and might all come in at the right moment, but
even so the performance would not be a success if they had been
engaged to provide dance music and actually played nothing but
Dead Marches.
And however well the fleet sailed, its voyage

vould be a failure if it vere meant to
actually arrived at Calcutta.

reach

Hew

York
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Morality, then, seems to be concerned with three things.
Firstly,
with fair play and harmony between
individuals.
Secondly, with what might be called tidying up or harmonising the
things inside each individual. Thirdly, with the general purpose
of human life as a whole: what man was made for ••••9 1

The actions required to keep a ship afloat are ones which are familiar

to the sailors on board; the task of staying in tune, likewise, is compat

ible with the skills of the musicians in a band.

For humans to be able to

care for their planet and ensure its longevity, they must also be familiar

with that planet, and become equally adept at keeping it afloat and in tune.

Their skills must be developed and honed to accommodate these needs, and

they must be able to� with clarity the reasons for undertaking these nev

skills.

Perhaps this latter theme belongs in the realm of religion.

ethic, like an action, may be well-intended (i�e., cohcerned with the

An

achievement of a positive outcome> , but that is not sufficient for sustain

ability.

The dimensions of vision and pragmatism are both crucial.

gion is intrinsically concerned with both.

Why is religion pertinent to these concerns?

Reli

Broadly speaking, reli- �;,_;-_�:

gion as an institution has traditionally dealt vith exactly these issues,

linking human nature with a vision of the future.

When people feel lost and

uncertain, they can turn to their religious beliefs as a refuge from those

sentiments.

Hot only can religion spare people the pain associated with

these feelings, but it has a powerful positive influence in providing
inspiration to motivate people to move forward in life.

Ervin Laszlo, in

his Goals for Mankind, assesses the prominent religions of this planet, and
kind cross-culturally.

One of the most significant of these elements (after

an evaluation of Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism, Confuc

ianism, Taoism, and the African traditions> is that •all the great religions
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possess concepts and teachings which encourage concern for the future. •92

Regardless of where one is born or what culture one adopts, part of one's

upbringing will probably involve some teaching about the proper care for

one's children, and the proper responsibility for the generations to follow.
There is no expectation for Laszlo or most other writers in this genre

that ve need a single vorld religion to maintain this concern and bring to

light other large concerns.

If such a religion could qualify for the

visionary element discussed above, it certainly would find itself at odds

vith that of compatibility, for it could not account for the widely diverse

aspects of the cultures on this earth.
as unlikely as it is undesirable.

cooperation among religions:

As Laszlo suggests, such an idea is

But there is hope nonetheless for

• •• unity within current diversity is pos$ible, and it is neces
sary if some of the deepest thoughts and experiences of mankind
are not to give rise to the exclusiveness and intolerance that
breeds inhumanity and violence. Such unit is be innin
today. Promoting it is one of the maJor tasks and
ties of all people who cherish their religious heritage
believe that it has a constructive role to play in the coming
age. 93

It is certainly the case that not all religious or ethical positions

are equally responsive to people 's needs; yet, in our necessarily changing

relationship with moral virtue, we continue (generally) to believe that we

do fit into the •bigger picture,• and we continue to harbor a hopeful and
inspiring vision of the future.

In other words, there is some consistent

force in people 's beliefs and motivations which maintains this hope under

changing conditions.

Thus, it seems that reli ion can and will

rovide

these beliefs, arraallow people to feel that they are participating in

something worthwhile, something that •matters• in some way.

Religion can

provide both the message and the motivation to see to it that an ethical

action is accomplished; its task is made easier it that action is seen as

both desirable and possible.

Every individual has the capacity to contri-
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bute to large societal goals, but every individual must take advantage of

that capacity if ·the societal goals are to be realized.

And it is not

unreasonable to ask religion for that •calling,• for a message about the

compatibility of moral acts with the way human beings are and about the

vision implicit in carrying them out.

On the particular level of sustainability, there is a growing litera

ture linking ethics and energy from a theological point of view, emerging

from a larger body of scholarship on the moral implications of nuclear war.
In fact, some influential. religious organizations have stated their public

views and policies with respect to both of these issues; in every case they

have endorsed a doctrine of sustainability and restraint.

The National

Council of Churches (HCC) , for instance, released an official energy policy

statement in 1 979, based on an extensive evaluation of ethical criteria.

This statement advocates a large-scale transformation to solar energy sys

tems and other renewable resources, and sets out clear JUstificat�ons much

like those discussed above: obligations to future generations, concern for

the probable consequences of present wastefulness, and even a notion of pru

dence.

It emphasizes an energy ethic grounded on ecological ideals: •whole

ness in the human and natural communities,• responsible use of technology,

and the •ultimate obJectives of society,• based on stewardship, redemption,

Justice, and hope.

Terms like •sustainability,• •equity,• and •participa

tion• appear often in the document, reflecting some of the moral priorities

of religious institutions. ·The bulk of this •energy ethic• literature,

written almost exclusively by scholars with religious

with the same issues, with minor variations.94

There is a clear mandate for

people in ministerial roles to begin educating and motivating their congre-

gants on energy issues.

The issues are reasonably clear, and the ethical

imperative is substantial.
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In the preceding analysis, ve have delineated some of the wide-ranging
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facets of internal ethics and have argued for �
he inclusion of relational�,..->-considerations into conventional moral discourse) In addition, ve have���

suggested that elements of our uniquely human nature cannot be ignored in
the assessment of ethical action, and that we must continually ask our-

selves, as Lewis says, •where the fleet is trying to get to •••• •

This

discussion is not so distant from questions of appropriate technologies for

the generation of electricity as it may sometimes have seemed.

As ve saw at

the beginning of this section, there is a lack of otivation for developing

photovoltaics within economics, despite many political and technological

suggestions to the contrary.

It is nov clear that ve cannot simply wait for

economics to make the case self-evident, though that will certainly be

essential to the widespread development of the technology.

Rather, we have

a moral responsibility and a oral incentive to begin advancing solar

energy, and to inspire those institutions which most influence society to

begin doing the same. Gthe preceding ethical analysis, ve can see that

photovoltaics contitute at once a prudent, visionary, virtuous, and humanly

compatible means of sustainabil�tr) The question which remains is a diffi-

------

cult one:

How are ve to

sustainability?

l?

How do we arrive at energy::::-

That is the focus of the final section of this thesis.

_.e,,,-{

� � r v-.->+- .

-

��,

� �
��
J
(�
- - - .. �

7�7

er

y·

Part III: Possible Strategies for Change

In the last section of the thesis, I will discuss three •strategies• of

encouraging our present society to think and act ethically about energy use

and production, and, more specifically, to adopt solar photovoltaic tech-

nologies.

Much of the literature concerned with environmental problems

evades the question of

_-

Some writers imply that an •ethic•
others suggest that

society will spontaneously create a whole new value system for itself; 95 but

the crucial issue of how these changes will occur is rarely considered.
Occasionally a writer is honest enough to confess that an answer is not

close-at-hand.

Donald Ferrell, in a provocative article entitled •Tech

nology and an Ethic of Limits: Beyond Utopia and Despair,• is perhaps the
most blunt in this regard:

How to awaken public concern on a national level and to create
the legal and social sanctions necessary to pursue such concern,
fractured as we are socially by narrow individualism
and
competing interests, is a question for which there may not be any
satisfactory answer. I frankly admit that I do not have one.96

This may well be the most important issue to address in achieving an eco

logically sustainable future.

While I cannot claim to have an answer, I

shall attempt to discuss what seem to be the two most likely strategies, and

then offer a proposal which synthesizes the key advantages of each.

I shall first consider what may be labelled the •paradigm shift• liter

ature, a school of thought originating in Thomas Kuhn's The Structure of

Scientific Revolutions.

This literature sees no other way to achieve ethi

cally feasible goals than radically to c�h���t�he
� �v�al
� u�e�s�s�te
� m
� !!......!o�f�------,c..
i.e. , to bring about a new paradigm.

The other literature I wish to discuss

is small but outspoken in its tenets: it holds that values cannot he quickly

c�nged, and that what progress we do accomplish will be effected by small,
incremental steps through a strategy known as •muddling• (or •muddling

-.

�� I
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through, • as it was originally titled) .

In conclusion, I shall propose that

a technique which might be called •visionary muddling• combines the prac

tical advantages of muddling with the visionary, idealistic attributes of
the paradigmatic changes so often suggested.

As we shall see, visionary

muddling already occurs in the real world, though it will require a great

increase in popu �ity before great achievements can be expected from it.

�
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Paradigm Shifts
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Thomas Kuhn ' s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions was itself a

revolution in the analysis of scientific thought. 97

Kuhn argued that

scientists, at a given time and in a given subJect domain, hold common

viewpoints, concepts, and •systems• -- which he labeled as •paradigms. •

By

tracing the impact of maJor scientists through history - including Galileo,

Copernicus, Newton, Lavoisier, Einstein, and Bohr - Kuhn showed that new
discoveries and new ways of looking at the world (as in Copernicus '

astonishing revelation that the earth is not at the center of the universe,

or even of the solar system) profoundly influence the way the scientific

community views the world thereafter.

As newly found facts are added to a

paradigm, it becomes increasingly tenuous and uncertain and is ultimately

overthrown by a new paradigm.

The process of achieving new scientific

revolutions, in this sense, is called a •paradigm shift. •

Such shifts

entail large enough revolutions of factual knowledge radically to influence
the methods and value system of the discipline in question. Kuhn did

not see these shifts as taking place in any rational way, for he commented

that •the competition between paradigms is not the sort of battle that can

be resolved by proofs•; rather, he said, a paradigm shift was to be seen

more as a •conversion experience. •98

He took this notion one step further in suggesting that •the normal-
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scientific tradition that emerges from a scientific revolution is not only

incompatible but often actually incommensurable vith that vhich has gone

before.•99

The world as defined by one paradigm, in other words, has

nothing in common with that of another; thus the two are difficult, if not

impossible, to compare.

As critics commonly noted, this signified an almost

complete failure of both competition and communication between paradigms.
In

1 970,

Kuhn came out with the second edition of the book, and in a

lengthy postscript he answered this and other criticisms.

In responding to

the attack on •theory-choice• (including both competing and communicating

systems ) , he suggeste� that paradigm shifts were matters of values and not!/� _

simply discussions over facts.

He contrasted theory-choice with the

incremental mode of debate over mathematical or logical proofs as follows:
In the latter, premises and rules of inference are stipulated
from the start. If there is a disagreement about the conclu
sions, the parties to the ensuing debate can retrace their steps
one by one, checking each against prior stipulation. At the end
of that process one or the other must concede that he has made a
mistake, violated a previously accepted rule. After that conces
sion he has no recourse, and his opponent' s proof is then compel
ling. Only if the two discover instead that they differ about the
meaning or application of stipulated rules, that their prior
agreement provides no sufficient basis for proof, does the debate
continue in the form it inevitably takes during scientific revo
lutions. 1 00

In deciding between paradigms, says Kuhn, •there is no

•systematic decision procedure• which will necessarily lead all scientists

to the same decision. The paradigmatic •conversion experience,• then is

achieved by group processes: •it is the community of specialists rather than

its individual members that makes the effective decision. •

He suggests that

this is the process of persuasion, but that followers of two (or more)

•incommensurable viewpoints• have difficulty in communication, much less

persuasion. 101

What is needed, then, is a translation process whereby the

language of one scientific community can be spoken and understood by
another.

He concludes, finally, that

�J���

�---
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Scientific knovledge, like language, is intrinsically the common
property of a group or else nothing at all. To understand it we
shall need to know the special characteristics of the groups that
create and use it. 1 02

Environmentalists were quick to adopt what they saw of the Kuhnian

notion of paradigmatic change: this can in part be attributed to concerns
about the man-over-nature mindset so pervasive in modern society.

Writings

of this sort have well documented the difficulty in envisioning a means to

societal changes which might reorient the dominant views.

Clearly, a belief

in paradigm shifts has been for these writers a comforting hope about the

long-term sustainability of humankind.

The bulk of work on environmental problems and sustainable futures

seems to characterize our ecological crises as paradigm problems.

In other

words, the responsibility for these crises is to be found in the mindset and

v�e system of the people who cause the damage done to the ecosystem. (!�
literature tends to approach the solutions to these problems in much

same terms: we need to change people ' s attitudes, values, and beliefs
want them to cease their harmful and unethical act�o�

he

Among those who

we

have written in this vein are William Ophuls., Rachel Carson, Barry Commo
Robert Heilbroner, Garrett Hardin, Paul Ehrlich, Lester Brown, and E. F.
Schumacher.

In my Judgement, the paradigm notion has been greatly abused in

environmental literature, and Kuhn ' s definition has been lost in the

excitement over the possibility of changing people ' s values, instigating a
wide-scale religious revolution, and reshaping society in order to bring

matters like sustainability to the fore.
-

In fact, there seems to be no

precise definition of the ��ore.
?

There are many problems and

concerns hidden within any discussion of paradigm shifts � l will take up

three of these matters here.

a paradigm shift?

First, what assumptions are involved in making

Is it possible to look on the process of change as simply
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a •strategy,• or are there hidden meanings beneath it?

This is not a fully

answerable question, but I will uncover a few underlying assumptions which
are generally ignored in writings on paradigms.

digm idea apply to electricity generation?

Second, how does the para

Can one say that there are pres

ently aspects of a paradigm which are antagonistic toward solar energy or

that a shift is taking place?

This question will be answered with an

extended example, based on a provocative new article about the Washington

Public Power Supply System.

Finally, and, to my mind, most importantly,

If we

what can be done !!Q!. to achieve a shift into a sustainable paradigm?

employ the ethical themes assessed in Part II and perhaps account for the
assumptions discussed in the initial question above, is there a clear

strategy for forcing, or at least encouraging, a paradigm shift?

Assumptions Behind Paradigms

paradigm notion

as a

The environmental literature looks upon the

strategy: everything will be all right (i. e. , the

ecological crisis will pass> if we change people' s values through this

magical intangible entity called a paradigm shift.

While it is very

tempting to fall into this logic, I am inclined to think it a trap.

It is

perhaps worth remembering that hope was the only evil which did not escape
from Pandora 's box; we can no more expect sustainability from a paradigm

shift than we can expect it from a technological fix.

The notion of para

digm shifts conceals at least four troubling assrimptions: a) the supposed

•rightness• of the new paradigm, b) the ease of transition between para

digms, c) the distinction between thought and action, and d) what I call the

---

---..

•overlay• phenomenon in the hope for paradignratic change.

The first of these concerns the paradigm itself rather than its imple

mentation.

society.

Paradigm shifts call for •a profound change in values• 103 within

The literature tends to assume that the new paradigm is advan

tageous over the present one and over alternative paradigms.

But how are
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these competing values to be Judged?

Environmentalists often describe ideals of self-sufficiency, small

scale, sustainability, self-reliance, community, and even such vague themes

as honesty, modesty, sincerity, conviviality, etc. ; little is ever said

about vhat this entails in paradigmatic terms or hov these themes compare to
a •nev paradigm• offered by another sector of society for our future . 1 04

What underlies the assessment of superiority is a moral argument: the nev

paradigm is •right,• perhaps by a utilitarian notion that it vill foster

activities in the best interest of a larger number of people than it vill

harm -- but, again, this dimension is not spelled out.

The environmental

literature claims to knov what the nev paradigm entails - without ever

Justifying, or, in some cases, even stating, it. When writers do identify

factors vhich are crucial to the nev system, they are strikingly unimagina

tive and, more important, unsubstantiated.

Hovard Odum' s •energy ethic

commandments• are indicative of the values he expects to find in his future

paradigm, but they give the reader nothing to fasten onto, nothing to relate

to, and nothing, finally, to Justify the ideal presented:

Thou shalt not waste potential energy.
Thou shall knov vhat is right by its part in survival of the
system.
Thou shall do unto others as best benefits the energy flovs of
the system.
Thou shall Judge value by the energies spent, the energies
stored, and the energy flov which is possible.
Thou shall not take from man or nature without returning services
of equal value. 1 05

So the paradigm itself is mysteriously •known• and mystically •right,• but

we are left wondering what a paradigm shift might be like if we can explain

so little about the paradigm itself.

Perhaps some consensus is needed on \ \

,�-J

+J
�

I � ·

the actual attributes of a new paradigm so that s�ety has some idea whe�
it would like to go �nd whd it would like to be.

�
_ {')

If the new paradigm cali

for a sustainable state, then what is included under the heading of sustain-

�1
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ability?

Is decentralization a necessary aspect?

For the purposes of this

discussion, these questions may be left unanswered, but if any group of
people wish to

suade societ

undergo a change in values for a partic-

--:,,
�
-

ular end, they will have to be clear on what they wish to achieve.

In the

current literature, the paradigm notion is used without content, and without
content persuasion becomes a near impossibility.

The second assumption I want to mention has to do with the ease of

transition from one paradigm to another.

One might recall Pete Seeger' s

• Talking Blues • for the ultimate in smooth transitions:

How if you want to go to heaven let me tell you what to do:
You' ve got to grease your feet in some mutton stew.
You Just slide out of the devil' s hand
and ooze over to the Promised Land -• Take it easy - go greasy. •

It seems that writers on paradigms of all sorts expect few troubles in dis

missing the old and implementing the new.

Or perhaps it has not occurred to

them that the transition itself might be an issue with which to be con

cerned.

Some of the scenarios suggested for the • evolution • of a paradigm

shift are at once frightening and frighteningly naive:

After a paradigm shift begins, progress is fast though fraught
with tension.
People get angry. New discoveries pour in to
support the new belief system . . . , and scientific revolution
occura. 1 O6

�:

Perhaps these writers are relying, once again, on the utilitarian ethic that � -

only a few will be crushed when the rest rush for these new ideals.
nothing so simple can be assumed:

But

If the new paradigm involves the decen

tralization of decision-making and electricity generation, a weak central

government, and an economic incentives-program for the use of renewable

resources, who is to say that monied interests will not exert their power

and start a monopolistic electric utility?

What will prevent the organiza

tion of new elites which strive to undercut the paradigm shift?

How, in

,; 7
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other words, do we avoid hurting the many groups of people who find the

present paradigm more satisfying than our dreams of a new one?

In addition

to knowing where we want to go, we must also be avare that certain aspects

of the shift to that goal are subJect to external forces.

In fact, ve may

have an exceedingly small amount of control over the change at any stage. /
Environmental writers in this genre 1 07 seem to respond with the imp

lication that I am thinking in current paradigm terms, and that •if I could
only see• the values held by the new paradigm, I would be convinced to Join

in the transition.

Why should we impede the freedom of today 's society for

an unknown, untried future?

nothing to revolt for?

How can we have a paradigmatic revolution with

These are questions which these writers have failed

to address in their fervor to get the shift over with so we can begin to

concern ourselves with sustainability itself.

together lead to a rather unsettling scenario:

This and the first assumption
As William Faulkner remarks

in Go Down, ftoses, it is as if we were talking about •those upon whom free
dom and equality had been dumped overnight and without warning or prepara

tion or any training in how to employ it or even Just endure it••••• 108

A third assumption is popular in literatures on all sorts of paradigms:

once we have the paradigm, ve will be able to correct our old actions;

therefore, all ve need worry about now is to change our values.

In my

opinion, the environmental literature has been particularly guilty of
equating •value change• with •paradigm shift. •

As we have seen in Kuhn,

there is certainly far more to changing paradigms than changing values.

iY7 /]��
y- _;...,'r-r
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1
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Initially, a scientific revolution would begin with a reconceptualization of

facts; the associated methods and worldviews are added baggage in the

transition.

His term, I wish to argue, has been compromised to signify

exclusively a change in beliefs or values.

If this were the case, paradig

shifts would probably happen far more readily than they do.

-,...ls }

Page 65

While Kuhn never stated this explicitly, it is clear that the rarity of

shifts in history (the total number can probably be counted on two hands

significant: to achieve a new paradigm there must be a revolution in though

and action.

r ,q
v0

(

i)

Polls have shown that many

J..,

1v�J

One can, arguably, change one without the other, but a paradigm�

shift has not been achieved without both.

vv-'J
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Americans believe in environmental protection and even in efforts toward
sustainability. 1 09

But America's dominant paradigm can be seen clearly in

the exploitation of natural resources, the use of nuclear power, the

reliance on central-station power plants, the inflexibility of utilities,

and so on -- pursued by many of the same people who express concern for the

environment.

..

�

�

Perhaps this is accountable to •salience• -- i.e. , environ- �· �

mental concern is not a high priority for most Americans, so an expression

of concern is generally not meaningful in terms of action.

important point, I think, is this:

But the

It may well be that changing people's

values is essential to the long-term habitability of •spaceship Earth, • but
the task of shifting an entire paradigm is far more complex than many

authors seem willing to admit or accept.

In addition, a crucial distinction

will have to be made between simply believing that pollution is evil and

believing that one must adopt a pattern of life which fosters these changes.

The current beliefs of Americans may not have advanced to that stage as yet.
The final assumption I shall label the •overlay• phenomenon.

A healthy

proportion of the environmental literature looks to values out of America's

'-.::---

past as the necessary constituents of an environmentally sustainable future.

/ warren Johnson's The Future Is -Not -What It -Used to
Be: Traditional Values in
- -/

!.!!. Age of Scarcityl lO is only the newest and possibly the most hQnsst

account of this sort.

"1

But regardless of the era from which this new para

digm collects its belief system, many writers emphasize the need to replace

the entire system we currently adhere to or at least to reconsider a great

many of its central tenets.

In place of wastefulness will be frugality; for

).,.;_ �
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egocentrism will be altruism; instead of competition wil l be cooperation;

etc.

Little thought is given to the relation between the new values and the

old.

Yet there is a relation:

system in its entirety.

We do not actually wish to replace the

On the general social level, we do not wish <I

imagine ) to give up many of our technologies and innovations, from contra

ception to airplane travel to radio or telecommunications. 1 1 1

That part of

society which is concerned with alternative energy is thankful to have
numerous technologies in efficient submarine turbines for unobtrusive,

ecologically benign hydroelectric power; computer systems to monitor and

improve the energy use of generating facilities and end-uses alike; and so

on.

These technologies have· all been bred from our present value system,

and they can certainly be argued to be important components of our modern

day dominant social paradigm.

The analogy I wish to draw is that of a common sentiment among adults

of all ages: most of us, at some point in our lives, wish we could be

children again, or wish we were young again.

While that is a paradigm shift

which is not yet technologically feasible, the parallel is an interesting

For I think it is the case that the simple wish to be young and play

one.

ful is not the wish we intend vhen we express that wish.

Rather, I contend,

we are interested in going to a particular early stage of our past with

current knowledge and experience.

Q.Y1:.

What we want is to be young and to have

the perspective on being young which we now possess.

Recall Emily Gibbs in Thornton Wilder's Our Town, wanting so much to

relive a happy day out her life now past.

•Emily, don't.

It's not what you think it'd be. •

taken back to her twelfth birthday.

minutes; she cries I

can't.

One of her neighbors warns her,

I can't go on.

Oh !

But Emily insists, and is

After observing herself for a few

Oh.

It goe• so fast.

We

don't
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have time to look at one another. I didn' t realize. So all that
was going on on and we never noticed. Take me back • . •• Do any
human beings ever realize life while they live it? - every, every
minute?

•No,• comes the answer from her mother.

Another neighbor admonishes her:

Yes, now you know. Now you know ! That' s what it was like to be
alive. To move about in a cloud of ignorance; to go up and down
trampling on the feelings•• • of those about you. To spend and
waste time as though you had a million years. To be always at
the mercy of one self-centered passion, or another. How you know
- that' s the happy existence you wanted to go back and see. 1 1 2

Looking down on the people moving about in the town of her life, Emily

laments: ·They don' t understand much, do they?•

•No dear, not very much. •

Her mother again responds,

And so the play ends. 1 13

What we would like, it seems, is to •overlay• our current paradigm with

one of sustainability.

It is neither practical nor useful to rid ourselves

of our sinful paradigm so commonly criticized; in all probability, we have

little control over a paradigm or the means to its attainment in Kuhnian
terms.

As already noted, the simple fact of the rarity of these shifts

suggests that they require considerably more than the mere will to effect
change.

We might spend our effort more prudently in adding what needs to be

added and subtracting what needs to be subtracted

approach to what is certainly a significant problem.

taking a piecemeal

Before advancing to

----

that stage, let us briefly ponder some of the implementational aspects of

the paradigm shift strategy, despite the clear conclusion that as a •strat-

egy• it is riddled with unanswered questions and unquestioned assumptions.
Paradigm Shifts in Electricity Generation?

-------

There is clearly an American

paradigm which Justifies our domination over nature, our flagrant exploita

tion of natural resources, and our narrowly economic concern for a material-

istic ·here and now. •

Lynn White, in his now famous article, ·The Histori

cal Roots of Our Ecologic Crisis,• blames the Judeo-Christian paradigm for

our current environmental problems:

•Both our present science and our

}
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present technology are so tinctured with orthodox Christian arrogance toward

nature that no solution for our ecologic crisis can be expected from them

alone. • 1 1 4 This and other writings demonstrate the widespread expectation

for a radically different value system to solve our problems.

David Ehren

feld follows much the same theme (though without the religious overtones) in

The Arrogance _of Humanism.1 1 5

Part of this dominant para�igm dictates that,

if the ecological effects of our exploitation become severe enough, we will

employ innovative solutions known to environmentalists as •technological
fixes. •

Julian Simon is an outspoken exponent of the reliance on human

ingenuity: his best known book is aptly titled The Ultimate Resource. 1 1 6

Herman Daly, the originator of the most influential counter-paradigm - known

as the steady-state economy - commented that three of the greatest technolo

gical fixes have all experienced severe failures in solving environmental

problems: the green revolution, nuclear power, and outer space. 1 1 7

Nuclear power clearly does not by itself constitute a paradigm.

But I

think it provides a concrete example of some of the prevalent values in the

larger American value system, a system which holds that •bigger is better,•

that •the ultimate resource• will find a way to dispose of radioactive

wastes, and that these power plants will produce electricity •too cheap to

meter. •

As Hazel Henderson appropriately subtitles one of the chapters in

The Politics of the Solar Age, we are here concerned with •Nuclear Versus
Solar Energy as Symptom of the Paradigm Shift. • 1 1 8

these issues, let us take a specific case.

Better to understand

A consortium of ten utilities in the Pacific Northwest (which has

traditionally relied on hydroelectric power for about 60-70X of its •fuel
mix,• supplemented by oil- and natural-gas-fired plants for the region's

remaining electricity needs) decided to invest heavily in nuclear power.

The proJect they began was formally called the Washington Public Power

Supply System < WPPSS) .
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These utilities had never built any nuclear power

plants before, but they initiated plans to construct five plants simultane

ously.

Through a complicated financing plan, both the government and bond
In the early 1970 ' s, when

holders were heavily involved in the proJect.

this was all being established, nuclear power was indicative of a burgeoning

paradigm.

Many people not only believed that atomic energy was the future

of the world' s electricity supply, but they also invested in that belief.

Charles Schultz, • Peanuts • cartoonist, had a • $75,000 security blanket • of

WPPSS municipal bonds.

the same bonds.

The Vikings football club owned $200,000 worth of

In fact, 78,000 private citizens from all across the

country invested in the proJect.

Many elderly people put their entire

assets into it; for what could be a better (and safer) investment than a

proJect which was both funded largely by the government and so clearly the

up-and-coming power supply technology?

the faith Americans had:

This portion of a letter suggests

· When I told my wife about investing $25,000 in •••

'

municipal bonds, she said to me ) David: Are they safe? to which I answered:
/

nargaret this is the government of the United States. • 1 19
\
But paradigms sometimes have the danger of being overly dream-like, and
//

�

utilities had been living in such a dream:

Despite many economic downturns

in our history, •utilities have been hard-pressed to plan for anything but

boom times, • 120 as demand for electricity has risen steadily for a century.

Thus it seemed quite appropriate to build more than was presently needed,
since other resources will eventually run out.

certainly become scarce far sooner than water. >

< Ironically, uranium will

So the WPPSS planning com

mission used optimistic population growth forecasts to Justify the need for

future power and present construction.

So optimistic, in fact, that they

ranged above those of the US Census Bureau:

• A region with a population not

much bigger than the five boroughs of New York was forecast to need more

electricity in 199 5 than the entire country consumed in 1950. • 121
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For nearly 30 years forecasts of this type were accurate, but in the

middle

1 970's

destiny. •

it became clear that the WPPSS utilities •mistook trends for

Demand for electricity was beginning to level off even then

Just in time for the completion of the first plant.

Through the later part

of the decade, banks began to express concern over these trends, driving

interest rates up to cover themselves.

The multiple effect of high interest

rates in tandem with cost overruns on the plants ran the total costs upward
at a rate of half i. million dollars per hour.

Nonetheless, the people's

faith in that larger paradigm seemed firmly entrenched.

As the author

suggests, •people had a vision of a nuclear world, a faith in the atom

matched by a sense of mission. •

But •somewhere along the way the road to

Eden went awry,• for it became increasingly clear that billions of dollars

would be lost if all the plants were constructed. 1 22

In June of 1 983, the Supreme Court of the State of Washington •wiped

out• all contracts between bondholders and utilities, and within a month the
WPPSS proJect defaulted on $2 . 5 billion of loans. 1 23

Now known as · Whoops,•

the system is likely to default on more of the aid it has received, for no

one is able to pay the tens of billions of dollars which have been lost in
the process.

Thousands of Americans showed their faith in part of a para

digm, and when that was overthrown, they found themselves with less than

they had before.

As these excerpts from letters painfully demonstrate,

everyday Americans were dumbfounded by the default:

I cannot begin to tell you the anguish, the arguments, the
humiliation, the frustration I had with my wife when we heard the
$ 25,000 will not even earn interest. 1 24

I have been swindled. I invested $30,000 in Whoops 4 and 5 . The
money was left by my late husband, and it represents my supple
ment to Social Security. I will be 65 , too old to get a Job, and
this default leaves me outraged, frightened, and helpless. 1 25

The containment building for plant # 4 (which was the only part built for # 4)

cost well over a million dollars to construct; it was sold as scrap metal
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for a trifling $ 1 4,000.

Today utilities in the Pacific Northwest are

beginning (individually) to offer loans to homeowners for the installation

of energy conservation measures.

The Northwest has more power than it knows

what to do with, and excess electricity (still produced by the old standard

hydroelectric facilities> is now transmitted to Los Angeles to aid in their

peaking capacity. Seattle City and Light, one of the only utilities which

refused to Join Whoops, has enJoyed large profits over the past few years,

and has begun subsidizing experimental proJects with stand-alone photo

voltaic systems -- in one of the country 's least sunny cities !
Whoops, unfortunately, is not alone in its failure.

Many other nuclear

power plants have been cancelled, loans have been defaulted, and utility

companies have found their capital requirements far exceeding any conceiv
able profits.

But Whoops is, to date, the worst of its kind.

The consor

tium finished one plant, mothballed tvo, and abandoned tvo more in the early

stages.

It set itself up for the largest default in U. S. history.

One of

the hundred lawsuits it faces is the largest securities fraud case in the

country' s history.

The worst may still come.

In the mid- 1970' s, the

system's managing director made the following comment, and I dare say he may
have been accurate, retrospectively:

The nuclear and utility community of the entire nation is looking
to the Supply System and its board to successfully complete this
maJor commitment to nuclear energy. For if we cannot do it here,
nuclear [power] may very vell not make it in this country. 1 26

Nuclear fission is not •making it• in this country, and its failure is, as

Hazel Henderson terms it, •symptomatic• of the larger, systemic weakening of

the worldviev that puts its faith in that •ultimate resource,• a resource
which is shoving its fallibility.

In Kuhnian terms, the failure of nuclear

power may well qualify as a significant •anomaly• in the reJection of an

outmoded paradigm.
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How to Achieve � Paradigm Shift?

We have shown, I think, that some

tremendous changes are needed in the American value system which still
upholds traditional nonrenewable energy sources.

Yet we have also seen that

defining the paradigm we hope to attain is far from easy, and that we take a

great deal for granted in assuming we can reach it, however defined.

Never

to effect a large change or paradigm shift to a sustainable society.

Here

theless, it is essential that society begin to consider what can be done now

is a summary of what some environmental writers think in terms of achieving

such a society.

Murray Bookchin suggests that the dissolution of hierarchy in the

formation of his anarchistic state will happen spontaneously, 1 27 and he

makes an almost moralistic plea for change, saying that Just because •human
ity was expelled from the Garden of Eden does not mean that we must turn an
antagonistic face toward nature••••• 1 28

William Ophuls predict� that we

will overshoot our environment' s carrying capacity by continuing our present

growth, and only then will we be able to establish a steady state economy -
unless we can achieve a value change first. 1 29

Rufus lliles wholeheartedly

advocates the need for •a profound change in values and a compass that will

take [Americans ] in a new direction. • 1 30

He sees a growing struggle

•between the ethics and ideology of materialism and the ethics and ideology

of ecology,• which will encourage this value change. 1 3 1

For Hugh Stretton,

it is a desire not for a new faith, but •to give better effect to

we already have,• which can come about only through socialism, which he
terms •government by consent. • 1 32

And for Isaac Balbus, it seems that

•authentic forms of shared parenting,• and the mutual cooperation of

feminist, participatory democracy, and environmental movements will see

through an environmentally sustainable society.

Balbus ' transition begins

with the motto from Woodstock: •teach your children well. • 1 33
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What is striking about so many writers concerned with the future of our
Ho one

environment, is the vagueness with which these issues are addressed.

seems willing to expose him- or herself by suggesting that we do X or Y in

order to bring about a paradigm shift.

I shall look superficially at the

three most likely schemes of implementation to try to find tasks or threads

of hope for what we might do now to encourage this • inevitable• shift.
The first option is a large scale •revolution. •

This is presented in

Ophuls' last chapter in quasi-religious terms, while for other writers134 it

is phrased more with ideology in mind.

Nonetheless, they use terms like

• change of heart • 1 35 •rediscovery• 136 •restructuring of knowledge, • • expan

sion of awareness of comprehensive, eternal truths, • 1 37 and •right liveli

hood • l 38 as ways to Justify and implement the future they foresee.

The

problem with • revolution • as a strategy is twofold: First, if these are the

terms which best describe the movement toward a sustainable society, then

-

many people will be completely incapable of understanding what it is that we

desire or see as necessary for the survival of humanity and the ecosystem.

These terms will alienate people excessively, and could ultimately prevent
an otherwise desirable large-scale paradigm shift.

They may well see their

present situation as bad, and a paradigm shift as being worse, especially if
a revolution is needed to achieve it.

The Irish folk music group De Dannan

sings a song with a pertinent line: • 1 never saw a man with one black eye

that wished that he had two. • 1 39

The other problem with revolts is that that their outcome can never be

foreseen, nor the toll they take if successful.

If a large group of people

is persuaded to band together to fight against the current paradigm (as must

have happened in tti

utions> , and they undertake

a battle, in whatever form, to bring about great structural change, what are

the likely outcomes?

If they are successful, will they win over the antag-

onists to the new paradigm?

their case heard again?
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If they fail, can they ever expect to have

Revolutions are costly affairs: once again, t�

�
rarity in history is suggestive of the success with which they are w
�
The second alternative is education.

Proponents of this approach would

probably want to see public schools, colleges, and non-institutional •moral

education• (at home, in church, and at work, for example) provide, encour
age, and inculcate the values necessary for a paradigm shift.

But there are

a number of problems with this •solution• to the implementational question:

First, not everyone agrees that values should be passed on through an insti

tutional process.

Kax Weber, for instance, long argued for a strong dis-

tinction and separation between fact and value, .to such an ex.tent that pro

fessors should refrain from influencing students with their value Judgements
when it might endanger the teaching of more important facts.

For, he says,

students should be allowed to solve problems based on their own conscience
and not that of the instructor. 1 40

� � ,- �/

For our purposes, the most significant question raised by Weber's per-

�

� �-

ception that there can be no •ethical neutrality• in the teaching of values
is the age-old question of regulation:

who will watch over the watchers?

Who will watch over the system� and

If values !!:.!, going to be taught, how

will we ensure that those promoting solar energy, decentalization, and

whatever else is required for a shift to a sustainable paradigm will be set
forth, and not those of the current paradigm?

These questions will have to

be addressed if education is to play a role in a paradigm shift.
This is not to say that education can be of no help.

As Lest•r Brown

comments in his recent book, Building � Sustainable Society, institutions of
higher education are particularly valuable in research efforts which can

precede these shifts.

He aptly notes the impact of Energy Future, the

Harvard Business School ' s analysis of fuel usage and depletion; this work
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profoundly influenced many officials from industry and government alike as
no research with environmentalist origins could have. 1 4 1

Brown sees further

hope for education when colleges and high schools restructure course con

tent, enliven the presentation of materials, and begin to adapt their

curricula to older, non-full-time students who may have a greater concern
for practical skills for a new society. 142

offered suggestions along similar lines:

In an earlier book, Brown

Since necessary changes in attitudes, values, and -lifestyles are
called for quickly, the educational task at hand involves
•reschooling• many mature adults. Because value changes can pre
cipitate identity crises, such education can put great stress on
the individual. Informal educational networks are needed to deal
with emerging problems.
Business executives may need to be
briefed on environmental problems, and civil servants on popula
tion dynamics. 1 4 3

But Brown, of course, is hardly alone in seeing a role for educational

institutions in a paradigm shift.

Here are some examples of other writers

Jon Van Til, in his Living with Energy

who anticipate a role for education:

Shortfall, sees a strong connection between energy awareness and the use · of

conservation measures; education is one. means to heighten such awareness. 1 44

Aldo Leopold, in his well known Sand County Almanac, pursues this theme on a

far deeper level:

No important change in ethics was ever accomplished without
an internal change in our intellectual emphasis, loyalties,
affections, and convictions. The proof that conservation has not
yet touched these foundations of conduct lies in the fact that
philosophy and religion have not yet heard of it. In our attempt
to make conservation easy, we have made it trivial. 14 5

Wendell Berry, finally, favors education flavored with experience for the

•kindly use• of natural resources.

As he states in The Unsettling of

America, •kindly use depends upon intimate knowledge, the most sensitive

responsiveness and responsibility. •146

Surely we must use our educational

institutions to facilitate a large change in the mindset of the populace,

but we are at the mercy of time in doing so.

The apparent need for a

paradigm shift is that ecological scarcity vill close its grip on our life-
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style within a few decades.

Only a large and precipitous change in our

beliefs will reverse the screws on the vice�

Education does not function in

a short time scale; hence, even if we disregard Weber' s restrictive view on
the teaching of values, the extent to which education can precipitate a

paradigm shift is still unclear.

� I/ � - -
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The third option is the broad theme of governmental solutions.
'-CJ

�

On one

side are theorists like Heilbroner, who recommends authoritarian, centra

lized, coercive governments to see to it that the paradigm shift takes place

promptly.

But questions abound:

How are we to transform our democratic

society, partially central and coercive though it may be, into a truly

authoritarian system?

Who will run it?

values to be forced upon society?

And how will we ascertain which

Garrett Hardin' s •mutual coercion,

mutually agreed upon• 1 47 offers a possible answer, yet the questions of

implementation loom as large obstacles.

The other side includes proponents of a form of socialism or •govern

ment by consent. •

E

Stretton' s Capitalism, Socialism, and the Environ

ment is one of a strikingly small number of works connecting environmental

sustainability with socialism, sma� perhaps because the European socialist

states seem not to be moving in directions American environmental writers

�

The same questions must be asked of socialism that were put

to authori arianism: How do we make America a socialist state, a state

providing greater equality among all people?

At this point Stretton balks,

and resorts to the kind of language seen in the revolutionary literature :
To police equalities in a free society, there have to be
institutional and technical means of enforcing democratic control
of the use and distribution of resources. There has to be enough
legitimation of government to make it a forbearing but sovereign
arm of maJority rule. As a main part of that legitimation,
political practice has to rest on a good deal of popular faith•••
Material equalities may not by themselves generate much brother
hood, but they are a necessary condition of it. They may soon be
a condition of government by consent: the only workable basis

vwr-
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left for social arrangements between political equals. 1 48

If freedom and equality are as antithetical as some writers suggest, 1 49 then

the socialist ideal may require facets of an authoritarian state to maintain

one or the other.

With what are we left?

Murray Bookchin contends that the new paradigm

will - and perhaps should - come about spontaneously, without any of the

/ implementatio

complications suggested by other writers.

But Bookchin' s

sustainable society is largely anarchistic and thus requires no govern-

mental assertions of strength, no structural planning, no large-scale

revolution. 150

These . ideals seem even less feasible than those of struc

tured government.

But the chances of anarchy providing long-term altruism

toward the planet we inhabit are poor, to say the least.

We are left with

the empty feeling that society is helpless in effecting and inspiring a

paradigm shift if that shift is required in a short amount of time.

As we have seen, many writers agree that a new paradigm must replace

the •dominant western worldviev,•15 1 but no one seems to . agree on how,
when, or if it vill actually come about.

The picture I paint may seem

overly stark, overly tied to an •either-or• perspective, but I would like to

suggest that it is the apparent need for paradigmatic change which presents
such a portrayal.

Much of the so-called •doom and gloom• 1 ·

rature at

least implies that nothing short of a sudden change in values can possibly

prevent otherwise inevitable ecological disaster.

As we vill see in the

next two sections of the thesis, this is not the only way to see the world

and its future.

Karl Hess, in his little book titled Community Technology,

identifies what seems to be the one factor which separates the current

paradigm from a future one; the status quo from utopia.

He writes that much

of the problem with environmental futures is what they require of people.
For him, that makes them undesirable.

While I would not agree with that

\

\

.
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sentiti:.1nt, his description

of

l:.. . ·\·· . : ..

\..

the.obstacles is apt:

Utopias are not __. unattainable, . they are �?limply · undes�raple.
are, µndesirable because they mean.change· and change is .. .the
most people resist with more determination than any other
action.. · Any familiar situation is· preferred by most of us
urn.familiar one. 152

. _ _ They_
thing._
aocial
to any

· As :we· saw-in. the disausaion .of -ethics in. Part I__I-, ther.e,_fE:J a c;lear -link be .;;.
tween visd:on· and the agents who hold a vision..
that the shaping of such agents' character

We might go so far as to say

<e.g., through-religion) is nec

�s�ary fer the,:: ;formation_ of_ _ yi_ siori; in the virtue sch9c,�

Q _f: eth_ic�i

-��011_gh�,.

ve say that ·-moral<�ctions are evaluated.ion the :_qualities _of -the- person, ..
taking those actions.

A great burden is placed on human nature in order to

achieve.positive change.

What Hess

nature may not be up to that task.
a:c-e certain_dangers in this process.

is _ suggesting,· I think,.

is

that.

OU�

Whether or not that. is the case,. there
There is a cost to characte:r shaping,

and there is no guarantee of hov a newly motivated and inspired agent Yill
respond,.

Society is taking a- gamble, as- it were, . whenever it. attempts to

reorient people tc an unfamiliar_ and potent.i�lly problematic situat,iori._
So What can humanity do to encourage ethical actions vhich will aid in
the immediate transformation of the status quo tovard_environmentaliy soundgoals? _--There.

seem-�to' be

tvo options: passive and ac-�ive.

If we take the

_passive app'roach, ·ye'·can sit back and_ let the .inevitable _ec:ologit:�l crises
:force our behavior to change, as they surely_ vould if we let them. · Ho one
re.ally knovs when ..th.is· is likely to happen,.· or ·what the human. reaction will
be when-it does, but there is reason- to -believe that-,limited resources and
eacalated prices (if nothing else) would cause us to•re ...: evaluate our
lifestyle..

.This- seems to me an irresponsible strategy, for it fails to

account :rcr ':!hat E. F. S_chumacher .call�d the "right livel.ihood�_ o; future
generations -- inclu_ding our �:nm children. _If society _has

any

interest

making-possible a future lifestyle resembling our ovn, then passivity
entirely lli"lsatisfactory route to this future.

is

in
an

--
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Thus, ve must take an active role in bringing about improvements.

As

we have seen in the preceding discussion, ve are restrained from effecting
large change if we do not have some sort of idea about vhat those changes
are or about vhere it is we vish to go.

Furthermore, ve vill not be able

to make those changes as quickly as we might like.

While a paradigm shift

offers many possibilities for a sustainable future, it offers little in the
way of pragmatic steps our current society can take tovard that future.
Muddling
There is another option that requires us to begin changing nov in
the anticipation that such crises vould have a negative impact if ve do not
work to prevent them.

If extensive changes cannot be accomplished quickly

under the present system, perhaps we vould be wise to vork tovard successive
approximations of the future we seek.

In other words, we should adopt a

theme of muddling toward environmental sustainability.

In the following

section, I will rely largely on the two writers vho have gained the most
fame for their vork in this area:�rl�blom and Warren Johnson.
So what is muddling, or •muddling through,• as it is often called?

It

can be seen at once as a •highly sophisticated form of problem-solving• and
•no method at all.•1 5 3

ftuddling is a blind fumbling for direction, a

compromising between many interests, an adaptation to small concerns, an
evolution of interests, and a response and adJustment to practical changes.
What good is it?

As Warren Johnson aptly points out in his book, ftuddling

Toward Frugality,
It may seem ironic to look on the stumblings of government
as an asset in coming to terms with the future, but given the
general resistance to change in any society, an inefficient
government actually protects us from the dangers inherent in
sustained economic growth to the point of overgrowth. Government
inefficiency encourages - even forces - individuals to take their
lives into their own hands, or in other words, to adapt. 154

Page
The muddling notion was first articulated and popularized by Charles
Lindblom in

1959,

Through'. •155

< ;

\. .

in an article entitled ·The Science of 'Muddling

If an administrator was to be given the responsibility for

designing and implementing a certain policy, Lindblom suggested that his
strategy would be to adapt the policy to established realities.

He would

probably not employ the •textbook• approach of listing and priority-ranking
the essential values and obJectives underlying the policy, becoming informed
on all theoretical and scientific knowledge on the area the policy would
cover, and weighing the relative efficiency of different policy outcomes.
Rather, Lindblom expects that an
coping strategy.

ad�inistrator would take a

He would identify a baseline, practical goal for the

policy; he would ignore many of the social values which affect, and are
affected by, the policy; he would •rely heavily on the record of past
experience with small policy steps to predict the consequences••.•; and he
would take existing interests as the primary forces in determining the scope
of the policy.

156

The fact is, according to these authors, that people (and, by exten
sion, the societies they create) generally fumble along, and find their life
patterns by trial and error, not by far-reaching comprehensive planning.

{i_

would maintain that it is a basic character of human nature (by which I mean
the set of patterns and habits that make all humans similar) 157 that maJor
change is difficult to effec;J As Johnso:-:omments in a recent article,
of most people is to minimize chan e. This is not surprising,
given the disturbing nature of so many changes today.• 158

A-<....�

Lindblom comments that •policy-

making is a process of successive approximations to some desired obJectives
in which what is desired itself continues to change under reconsideration. •159

o17�

What applies��

individual decision-making is exacerbated in group-processes like policymaking and other forms of social change.

1·� �

cl�.�""--<.

In sum, muddling is the formulation of policy (or change of any

+--�..
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sort) by the influence of multiple pressures, rather than the calculated
planning of a so-called •scientific method. ·
A common criticism of muddling is that it fails to achieve anything at
Policy makers spin their wheels when they muddle, and futuristic

all.

ideals are completely lost in the process.

As Johnson indicates, muddling

notions are attacked because of their tendency to •preserve the status quo
or, worse yet, the power elite, rather than identifying what is truly in the
public interest and working toward it. • 160

A response to this criticism can

be offered in terms of the public interest itself, so I shall briefly follow
that argument.

It may be said that it is the public interest itself that is

highlighted in the surveys discussed above: people show that they care about
environmental sustainability, but they would rather that the government do
something about it than they themselves. I shall not here examine various
definitions of the public interest, or even ponder whether something by that
name even exists. 161

But if there is a public interest and if it is

expressed through this kind of survey, it would not be unreasonable to
assume that our form of democratic government is ever so slowly
toward the goals which people have collectively desired.
As a matter of fact, America's strongest solar legislation is buried
a huge and complex law which was formulated on muddling principles.

The

Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 <PURPA)162 covers issues
ranging from lifeline electricity and natural gas rates to peak power
supply, from fossil fuel transportation to the proper use of hydroelectric
power.

(

Buried among its 80 sections are two which have attracted a great

deal of attention among environmentalists and especially alternative energy
advocates:

Sections 201 and 2 10 in Title II of PURPA require that utilities

purchase excess power from small electricity generating facilities at
reasonable and fair rates, and that •qualifying facilities• could produce up
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to 80 KW (Megawatts) of electricity and still be able to sell the power to
utilities at the same rates.
As I have argued in a recent paper, 163 these sections of PURPA were
strikingly ill-considered in the early stages of formulation.

The 80 MW

ceiling was set arbitrarily, with little evidence substantiating even the
order of magnitude for that figure. The rates which were established were
based on a Congressional reluctance to encroach on the traditional authority
of state agencies to regulate utility rate-making procedures, a dismissal of
exceedingly complex analyses (which were at the disposal of legislators
should they have wanted them>, and a general hastening of the hearings
allotting each successive expert less time in which to testify>.
What is fascinating about this law is two-fold:

First, while the

decision-making process which brought it to passage was very much one of
muddling, the end result was not at all incremental, hardly •at the margins
of the status quo, � as one writer terms the typical outcome of muddling
strategies. 164

Rather, PURPA has been the inspiration for more alternative

energy facilities and more electricity (waste-heat> cogeneration setups than
any other law in U.S. history.

According to the office responsible for

regulating Sections 201 and 210 of the law, hundreds of applications for
qualifying facilities have been received in the last half of this year
alone. Despite the Reagan administration 's apparent distaste for solar
energy, 1984 will be a record year for PURPA applications! 165

\
)
PURPA cannot

be dismissed as incrementally or marginally different from existent poli
cies despite the fact that it was created by those methods.

Lvv--�

The other astonishing division of strategy and result in PURPA is the
seemingly inconsequential matter of peaking.

•Peaking• refers to those

periods when demand for electricity is at its maximum, or its •peak. •

For

the vast maJority of a given day, a utility only needs to generate a base
line, fairly constant amount of power to meet the demand, but it must have

7
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the capacity (i. e. , •peaking capacity•) to supply extra paver vhen needed.
Peaking capacity is the most expensive part of a utility's operation, since
it requires proportionally more fuel per kilowatt generated and usually
requires the start-up and shut-dovm of equipment vhich is otherwise unused.
Why is this important?

In the hearings, the committee reports, and the

final bill, PURPA never clearly connects alternative energy and utility
peaking problems.

It turns out that most U. S. utilities experience peaks

sunny summer afternoons when everyone simultaneously decides to turn on
their air conditioners and fans.
happens at the same time.

The peak efficiency of photovoltaics also

PURPA has, almost by default, permitted a number

of utilities to cease worrying about peaking capacity; instead, they gladly
pay small power generators to provide that extra paver when it is needed.
Thus we can see that muddling is capable of solving environmental
problems, and even, more importantly, of leading us to a sustainable future.
But we cannot, by any means, guarantee that a law like PURPA will happen
again.

In analyzing that lav, one has the uneasy feeling that it was a

fortunate mistake, and that, if the legislators had considered it as care
fully as they perhaps should have, it would not have turned out nearly as
benevolent or beneficial to solar energy as it did.

We cannot count on a

haphazard, status-quo-bound process to solve our environmental problems.
Muddling cannot be expected to give us a PURPA very often.

r.

�

CA----� J

" Muddling does prevent huge failures, but it prevents maJor gains as

well) It would rather accept a certain amount of a factory's pollution

in�,�
�·

order to maintain the Jobs of the workers and the economy of the factory
town if the alternative were a comprehensive pollution policy which closed
dovn all factories emitting more than X units of pollution per day, or an
effluent tax on each Y units emitted.

Due perhaps to its extreme caution,

muddling is capable of preventing paradigm shifts of . all sorts from hap-

1
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penihg, for value systems are forced into a state only marginally (if at
all) different from the status quo.

For that perhaps we should be glad: the

fusion power advocates are planning their small part of their version of a
On

larger paradigm shift Just as the photovoltaic camp is scheming on its.

its own, muddling will not lead us to the kind of sustainable society seen
as necessary and desirable by the paradigm shift literature.

On the

contrary, one could easily argue that the muddling strategy itself, which

�-

this country has accepted in its recent history, is what needs drastic
reorientation if ever a new paradigm is to come about.
Where does this leave us?

Is there any hope for finding an unob

structed route to sustainability?

Has the literature offered us all of the

available alternatives? These are questions which may not have answers, but
they require attention nonetheless.

In the following section, I will

undertake that task in examining the possibilities for visionary
muddling.
-

4 �
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Visionary Muddling
We need an alternative that avoids the problems noted above.

The

literature on paradigm shifts has shown itself to lack a concrete goal in
terms of the paradigm it intends, or hopes, to reach; its implicit vagueness
suggests potential difficulties in knowing how to reach it.

Additionally,

what a paradigm shift actually entails requires considerably more time than
appears to be available for the required changes.

We ask of our institu

tions in short order what they have largely been incapable of accomplishing
over the course of modern American history.

Paradigms easily become

overwhelming, too, for they tend to involve changes on a large and all
encompassing scale.

Just as the institutional infrastructure is incapable

of handling tremendous reorientations of belief, these changes are probably
incompatible with the day-to-day functioning of individual human beings as
well.

Finally, we have seen that it is not feasible to return to the past

�
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as many environmentalists have suggested.

Our society has advanced techno

logically to a point where the reJection of certain aspects of our lifestyle
will be an extraordinarily difficult endeavor.

We simply lack the time we

would need to find a compromise between the status quo and the ideal quali
ties of the past.

Paradigms shifts require both the necessary content to

make the paradigm possible and the proper means to attain it.

Our analysis

has not led us to believe that these conditions have been satisfied.

Para

digm shifts have proved themselves an�-G-Option.
Muddling, on the other hand, offers little in the way of direction, for
it tends to work its way in minute concentric circles around the status quo.
Incrementalism is extremely cautious, and relies too heavily on precedent:
it rarely provides a clear goal or direction.

In contrast to the needs of a

paradigm shift, muddling is a slow, evolutionary process that requires gen
erations to achieve perceptible change.

In terms of shaping new societal

values.to support sustainability, an incremental approach is unlikely to
offer· any promise.

If people tend toward the familiar by their nature,

muddling can only reinforce this pattern, and only deepens the hole from
which we need to climb.

----

These problems point to the need for a symbiosis between the two strat
egies.

v----�-__:.;,

I would like to suggest a strategy cil1ed •visionary muddling• as an

alternative to the two traditional options we have discussed.

This scheme

would combine an emphasis on the familiar with a strong sense of direction
and which, most importantly, would hope to to bring about sustainability
within a reasonable timeframe.

Visionary muddling can be described in terms

of four principles: a) the vision itself, b) the need for familiarity, c) an
emphasis on empirical experimentation of alternative strategies, and d) an
orientation to feedback.
Vision is the largest single factor which distinguishes this strategy
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from ordinary muddling.

If people have a relatively clear sense of where

they want to go and what they want to do, they are much likely to seek that
goal than if there were nothing at which to aim.

We have seen that the

American infrastructure has muddled its way into a centralized electricity
generation system which is inextricably tied to a tenuous and ultimately
finite resource base.

The usual muddling approach would maintain that link

until the pattern is clearly maladaptive -- when necessity dictates an
alternate pattern.

---

Even with a vision as simple and indistinct as energy

sustainability, we can begin working to avoid the �indication� of the
muddling approach; we can, in other words, avoid the consequences of the
prevalent •better-late-than-never• attitude.
In order to advance to the stage of developing photovoltaics, we must
see the need to investigate alternative and renewable technologies.
that simple vision, we have no hope of achieving any of our goals.

Without
And

while sustainability is perhaps not a controversial or even a profound
vision, it is probably more compatible with human nature than a more complex
or more refined vision one might propose.

A simple goal which presents a

large number of alternative options and tasks has great potential where
people might easily disagree on any single route.

Energy sustainability

offers us many diverse visionary activities.
Another aspect of vision is the problem of inspiring people to have a
vision at all.

It seems to me that ethics provides the motivation to strive

for a vision as well as some criteria for what that vision might entail.

As

we concluded in Part II, a synthesis of the maJor schools of ethical thought
offers considerable power to inspire actions which contribute to the future
of our planet and its inhabitants.

Utilitarianism provides the mandate to

undertake future-thinking actions and demonstrates our clear obligation to
the generations which will •inhabit• that future; this parallels the para
digmatic view in the environmental literature which devotes almost exclusive

•
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attention to the future.

Deontology, on the other hand, suggests restraint

in these actions by reminding us of our multiple duties to both the present
and the future; we cannot simply spend our effort on future sustainability
without taking positive steps to deal with present-day problems of a similar
sort.

The concern for virtue, finally, reminds us of the need for compati

bility with human nature.

Humans are unlikely to take actions which appear

dissonant with their character and their interests •. When the visionary
ingredient is added to this ethical recipe, people can find ample reason to
become inspired to make a difference.

Religious beliefs offer a great deal
to be a part of the

in promoting, among other things,
world at large and to participate

tions can be a central aid in the organization and presentation o
themes.

This emphasis on vision is a crucial addition to muddling.

The second significant factor in visionary muddling is the notion of
familiarity.

Paradigms in some sense may offer a type of vision, but we

have observed that there is little connection between humans as they behave
on a day-to-day basis and humans as they· are supposed to behave in the •new•
society.

The classic statement in the environmental literature about a

•drastic reorientation of values• would alienate a large proportion of those
it reached.

On this issue muddling shines where paradigms cannot.

If we

are to strive toward energy sustainability through the use of solar electric
technologies, it behooves us to take small, reasonably sized steps toward
that goal.

Muddlers have long taken small, reasonably sized steps, but they

f'�

have never known of a larger g� thus their small steps have taken
them in <potentially> random directions.

PURPA was a case where that direc-

tion took a fortuitous and positive turn.

People are unlikely to do what is

not familiar to them, but they will certainly accept the challenge of a
visionary task if its precepts are presented to them in familiar terms.

In-

?
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deed, William Ophuls has suggested that a paradigm shift might occur through
the serial accumulation of small pragmatic steps - as it were, muddling
toward a paradigm shift.

Ophuls likens this to •the confluence of many

streams into a river. • 166
There is another important element of familiarity to consider: that of
experience.

Steps must be cautiously chosen not only in terms of their

scale but with regard to their !Y,-JLiJlrJ as well. The fact that solar cells
are presently being used to power railroad signals, for example, could prove
useful in motivating people to begin powering their homes.

The proponents

of paradigm shifts often fail to remember the importance of our past in
planning our future; indeed, our background and experience may be as crucial
as the vision which carries us forward.

If nothing else, our history

instructs us as to the errors we can avoid in a similar situation.

ftore

important, though, parts of our vision and our plans for initial steps can
be found in varioue aspects of our past, and can be expressed in many ways.
Religion could clearly play a useful role in suggesting elements qf our past
which 11ight beco11e part of our vision.

�

But religion is certainly not the only way for society to make profitable use of its past: this may well be the place for the broader application
of education.

If society can use its past and its experience to show the

possibilities for the future, it is already providing itself with an educa
tion.

One of the most profound expressions of our history is in our folk

lore and our stories.

We learn a great deal about our ethical standards,

our motivations, and indeed, our very nature, from the stories we hear and
tell.

For example, the Foxfire series 167 describes many aspects of folklore

for sustainable living in Appalachia. The Whole Earth Catalogs also provide
a similar service on a wider scale.

\ _
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In fact, in The Next Whole Earth Cata

log is a wonderful story about ·The ftan Who Planted Trees and Grev Happi-
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ness,• which could serve as an inspiration to many environmental causes. 168
Stories and folklore about the country-life are not lost on the many people
who will continue to be city-bound for the presence of natural imagery may
well remind people of that vision they are pursuing.

Our experiences have

been passed along from generation to generation in both oral and written
form, and we make daily use of their wisdom; yet, as soon as we begin
planning for a bold new future, we seem to lose sight of the past altogether.

Gi,.
The familiarity principle advises that ve not lose touch
�

�7

roots and our heritage in our visionary muddling scheme.

Another important facet in this strategy is experimentation - the
balance of the experience notion.

Policies and ethics which are created in

the abstract often lack a sense for what is possible, and one of the best
ways to find out what is possible is to experiment with different possibili
ties.

!uddling is an experimenting strategy, but it employs a •trial-and

error• approach; visionary muddling would offer a more systematic effort.
It will be crucial to explore many options in the quest for sustainability,
and to test many alternatives empirically under •real world · conditions.
For example, photovoltaics cannot feasibly be marketed on a large scale in a
decentralized format until utilities have ascertained the extent to which
maintenance can be accomplished by their own workers.

If a system for

repairs is not worked out before the new technology is widely adopted, its
chances of political and economic failure increase dramatically.

Experi

ments to determine these requirements on a community-wide level would be
ideal examples of visionary muddling, for they would allow utilities and
homeowners alike to find out how satisfactory this new energy production
system really is.

There is no point in installing large systems before such

proJects have been tried widely.
The principle of experimentation also points to the prudence of
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integrating many simultaneous forces, in contrast to the monolithically
unified drive of paradigm shift advocates.

Many different steps need to be

taken on many different levels, and the more steps which can be taken sooner
the more likely it is that sustainability will actually come about.

Such

steps would consist of practical proJects, some as only temporary experi
ments and others as small but longer-term changes.

The list might include

installing a solar hot water heater, insulating an attic, or initiating a
residential block-wide recycling program; it might also include larger tasks
such as service or information transfer, from volunteer mental health
programs to the new public domain •shareware• computer software movement.
All of these steps can be relatively small and tenuous, but all of them
suggest what Wendell Berry calls a •people-intensive•l69 - as opposed to a
•labor-intensive• - society, based on participation, low energy use, and a
satisfying lifestyle not paradigmatically different from that we live today.
Finally, visionary muddling is based on a system of feedback.

When

these small steps of innovative experiments are taken, there must some way
to assess their results, quantitatively and qualitatively.

People must be

able to know whether a particular direction was a useful one, whether it
offers more possibilities, and how those new sub-goals might be addressed.
Anything from a small community newsletter to a town meeting, from a high
school homework assignment to a questionnaire could serve as initiatives for
feedback.

Building a new recycling center by encouraging public partici

pation and following up the proJect with a widely distributed questionnaire
on usage and satisfaction would certainly qualify as visionary muddling
toward a broader form of sustainability.

The same could be done with a

school's solar electric energy system, with a system for monitoring com
plaints about its deterioration, aesthetic appeal, need for repairs, consis
�cy in providing adequate energy, and so on.

The possibilities are many.
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And the stakes are high.

American society cannot afford to wait for

necessity - in the form of resource scarcity - to decide how we are to
generate our electricity.

Within the next century, and probably before

that, some of these scarcities will be upon us.
offers a preventive measure.

But visionary muddling

It may help us avoid the trauma of sudden

demise and strive for a brighter future without even the inevitability of
such trauma.

With a vision as rudimentary as sustainability we can begin to

take the many small steps, to begin the numerous experiments, and to begin
to see what we collectively think about their results, and we can accomplish
much of the groundwork for a positive future before a different, less
desirable future decides these things for us.

The N�turalistic Fallacy

Traditional ethicists sometimes speak of the •naturalistic fallacy,•
referring to the problem of using •inappropriate evidence to substantiate an
ethical or policy conclusion. • 170 There are philosophical problems with
creating an ethic which is based solely on empirical foundations.

According

to G. E. Moore, in his monumental Principia Ethica, the natural sciences by
themselves could never adequately found an ethic, for there is a · distinct
class of ethical Judgments• which must draw on ethical premises. 171 To look
to human nature, the status quo, or some view of •reality• for ethical
Justification is to fall headlong into the naturalistic fallacy.
But Just as an ethic cannot be founded on empirical sciences alone,
neither can it be founded on ethical premises by themselves.

The literature

on the naturalistic fallacy seems to suggest that an ethic or policy can be
based on one or the other: �hich is good, the other which is no;) This
extremism could perhaps be titled the · black-and-white• phenomenon: the trap
of looking upon any theory, idea, or proposed solution as either terribly
ill-designed and hardly worthy of consideration on the one side, or utterly
profound and critically untouchable on the other.

In reality, the situation

is not so clearly delineated; between the black of natural science and the
white of normative underpinnings (if they may be so characterized) are a
great many largely unquestioned disciplines.

Economics, for instance, may

be classified as an empirical social science, but it relies on powerful
theories concerning human nature and the motivations of humankind.

Is it to

be ignored in an ethical consideration because it fails to fit into the
convenient boxes of the two extremes it falls between?

It seems to me quite

clear that ethical and political conclusions must rely heavily on the
physical limitations of the world they will affect.
There are three categories of the naturalistic fallacy, and each
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demonstrates this black-and-white phenomenon in a different way.

The first

class of error involves the susbstitution of the considerations of natural
science for those of an ethical nature.

Stating that action X is morally

correct because it has a risk Y that is distinctly lower than the risk Y'
associated with action Z -- this is fallacious reasoning.

Worse yet would

be a logic that risk A is moral simply because it has a low probability of
resulting in disaster.
scientific analyses.

Thus the ethical questions are circumvented by
ftoore suggests, and I think rightly so, that these

empirical considerations are only part of the larger ethical Judgement.
The second category of the naturalistic fallacy is that of deriving
•ought · (prescriptive) statements from •is• (factual) statements.

By this

argument, no amount of empirical evidence is sufficient for ethical conclu
sions.

Moore states that the simple reason that an obJect is desired is not

by itself grounds for concluding that it is normatively desirable.

He

comments, further, that it is wrong to assume that an action is ethically
appropriate simply because that action is being undertaken anyway. 172
Finally, one is in error if one fails to consider •the open question•
of whether a thing is good even if it has been defined as good.

If driving

a car is good because it has the •natural property• of getting me to work
faster, I have set myself up for the open question.

Is it by definition the

case that anything that gets me to work faster is good?

And on what basis?

All of these variants of the naturalistic fallacy have their merits,
but I still maintain that their proponents are the victims of the comple
mentary ·black-and-white• fallacy.

It seems to me to be more practical to

derive ethical conclusions from all parts of human knowledge in the pursuit
of a sustainable society.
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